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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is appropriate pursuant to
Utah Code Ann- § 35-1-82.53(2) (1988); Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-86
(1988); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989); Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(a) (1988); and Utah R. App. P. 14.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
There are no disputed issues of fact;

for purposes of

this appeal, petitioner accepts the Administrative Law Judge's
(ALJ) findings of fact.

In dispute is the application of law to

the facts found by the ALJ and Industrial Commission.

Based upon

the undisputed findings of fact, the issues are:
a.
applicant's

Whether

there

industrial

is medical

injuries

and

causation

her

between

permanent

and

the

total

disability.
Standard

of

review:As

interpretation

to the

application

of law, correction

of

facts to law

of error standard

or

of review

without deference to the decision of the administrative agency,
pursuant
Industrial
King
993);

v.

to

Utah

Code

Commission,
Industrial
Luckau

Board

§

63-46b-16 (4) ;

Willardson

v.

216 U.A.R. 12 (Utah App. June 28, 1993).

Com'n
v.

Ann.

of
of

Utah,
Review,

1

850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App.
840

P.2d

811

(Utah

App.

1992); Morton International,

Inc.

v. Auditing

Division,

814 P.2d

581 (Utah 1991) .
b.

Whether applicant qualifies under the "odd lot doctrine"

for permanent and total disability.
Standard of review: As to the application of facts to law or
interpretation

of law, correction of error

standard of review

without deference to the decision of the administrative agency,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) ;
Com'n
Board

of

Utah,

of

International,

King

v.

Industrial

850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993); Luckau

Review,
Inc.

840

P.2d

v. Auditing

811

(Utah

Division,

App.

Morton

814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988).
Attached hereto in appendix A of the Addendum.

2

1992);

v.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.
This is a petition for review of an Industrial Commission

of

Utah

Order

Administrative

denying
Law

petitioner's

Judge's

(ALJ)

motion

denial

for
of

review

of

permanent,

the

total

disability benefits.
B.

Course of proceedings below.
Applicant/petitioner Claudia Cox filed an application for

hearing seeking unpaid medical expenses, temporary total disability
compensation, permanent partial impairment compensation, permanent
total disability and interest on February 13, 1992, for an accident
which she suffered in the course of employment on August 15, 1988.
(R. 1 ) . A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge of
the

Industrial

Commission

of

Utah

on

August

5,

1992.

The

Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order denying benefits was issued on February 4, 1993.

(R. 64-87;

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, attached hereto in
Appendix B of the Addendum).
Cox filed her Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission
on March 5, 1993.

(R. 88). The Industrial Commission issued its

Order Denying Motion for Review on April 28, 1993.

(R. 116-124;

Order Denying Motion for Review, attached hereto in Appendix C of
the Addendum).

Thereafter, Cox filed her Petition for Writ of
3

Review (R. 125) with this Court on May 27, 1993, which Writ of
Review (R. 130) was issued June 10, 1993.
C. Disposition below.
The

Administrative

finding that the relatively

Law

Judge

(ALJ) denied

small portion

benefits,

of the petitioner's

overall disability which was caused by her industrial injury was
insufficient to support medical causation between Cox's permanent
total disability

and the industrial accident.

The

Industrial

Commission thereafter denied Cox's Motion for Review of the Order
denying benefits, from which denial this petition for review is
taken.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of this appeal, applicant/petitioner accepts
the findings of fact of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission.
Below are the relevant facts of this appeal, as found by the ALJ
and Industrial Commission.
1.

Claudia Cox, born March 10, 1940, began working for

Utah Power and Light in a clerical/accounting position in 1977.
(R. at 66; Appendix B at 3.)
2.

Ms. Cox had various back problems for which she

sought intermittent treatment from 1963 until 1986.
Appendix B at 3-4.)
4

(R. 66-7;

3.

On October 4, 1986 Ms. Cox was injured while riding

in the back of a pick-up truck in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Ms. Cox

suffered an acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary to
centrally herniated L4-5 disc, a mild buldge of the L3-4 and a
cervical radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve
roots C4-5 and C5-6 bilaterally.

As a result of these injuries,

Ms. Cox underwent surgery on January 5, 1987 whereby a semi-hemi
laminotomy, foraminotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 were
performed.

(R. 68; Appendix B at 5.)
4.

On August

5, 1987 Ms. Cox was

physician to return to work.
5.

released

her

(R. 69; Appendix B at 6.)

In December 1987, Ms. Cox suffered the first of two

industrial accidents.

As Ms. Cox went to sit on her chair, the

chair rolled back and away from her.

Ms. Cox fell to the floor on

her buttocks, which resulted in back pain and muscle spasms.
6.

by

(Id.)

On August 15, 1988, Ms. Cox suffered a second, and

more significant, industrial accident.
other workers who were on vacation.

Ms. Cox was filling in for
She attempted to open the

bottom drawer of one of her co-worker's file drawers.

Unbeknownst

to Ms. Cox, the drawer was filled with heavy books and papers.
When she tried to open the drawer, it stuck, jarring Ms. Cox's neck
and back.

Ms. Cox suffered severe and lasting pain in her back,

neck and arms.

Ms. Cox continued to work despite being in pain,
5

which

she

relaxers.

tried

to

manage

with

pain

(R. 70; Appendix B at 7. )

medications

and

muscle

Ms, Cox filed an accident

report (R. 16), and her description of the accident is corroborated
by her co-employees and supervisor.

(R. 17-18; attached hereto as

Appendix G of the Addendum.)
7.

Finally

on July

9,

1990 Ms. Cox was unable

continue working because of her pain.
8.

to

(R. 73; Appendix B at 10.)

Ms. Cox filed an application for hearing seeking

unpaid medical expenses, temporary total disability compensation,
permanent

partial

impairment

compensation,

permanent

total

disability and interest on February 13, 1992, for the August 15,
1988 industrial accident.
9.

(R. 1 ) .

On November 3, 1992, Ms. Cox was referred to a

medical panel for evaluation, which issued its report on November
27, 1992.

The ALJ adopted the medical panel report to resolve all

issues of causation and impairment.
10.

(R. 80; Appendix B at 17).

The medical panel found Ms. Cox to be suffering from

a 36% whole person permanent impairment.

(R. 78; Appendix B at

15) .
11.

Of Ms. Cox's 36% whole person impairment, 2.83% is

attributable to the industrial injury she suffered on August 15,
1988.

Id.

6

12.

Of Ms. Cox's 36% whole person impairment, 1.27% is

attributed to the industrial injury she suffered in December, 1987.
Id.
13.

The remaining percentage of Ms. Cox's whole person

impairment stems from her preexisting condition.
14.

Id.

Nothing has contributed to Ms. Cox's whole person

impairment rating since the industrial accident on August 15, 1988.
Id.
15.

The medical panel found that "there is a causal

connection between the applicant's symptoms" and the industrial
Id.

accidents.
16.

The ALJ found that Ms. Cox's testimony that her

condition worsened after her August 15, 1988 injury is supported by
the medical records.
17.

(R. 82; Appendix B at 19).

On December 21, 1992, Ms. Cox was declared by Social

Security to be disabled.

(R. 51-57, 65; Social Security Decision

attached hereto Appendix F at 1-6, Appendix B at 2) .
18.
(10)

The Social Security Disability decision lists ten

separate

disability.
(6) are

medical

problems

that

contribute

to

Ms.

Cox's

Of those 10 problems, there is a possibility that six

caused

by

the

industrial

accidents.

Appendix F at 2-3, Appendix B at 20).

7

(R. 54-55, 83;

19.

Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, upon evaluating Ms. Cox,

determined on March 30, 1992 that there was no way that Ms. Cox
could

return

to

work

disability retirement.
20.

A

and

that

she

should

receive

a

speedy

(R. 76; Appendix B at 13).

functional

capacity

evaluation

of Ms. Cox at

Carbon Emery Physical Therapy/Alta Health Services determined that
she could only participate in light/sedentary work.
21.
disabled."

Id.

The ALJ found that Ms. Cox is "probably totally

(R. 85; Appendix B at 22).
22.

Legal causation is not disputed.

(R. 81; Appendix

23.

The ALJ denied Ms. Cox's application for permanent

B at 18).

total disability benefits, finding that the industrial accidents
minimally contributed to the applicant's overall disability.

(R.

82-5; Appendix B at 19-22), and that Ms. Cox had other medical
problems which "could have affected the applicant's ability and
motivation to continue working."
24.

The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the ALJ's

finding, stating that
applicant's

(R. 82; Appendix B at 19).

impairment

accident of August

"The relatively
that

was

small proportion of the

attributed

to

the

industrial

15, 1988, is, in our view, insufficient to

support a finding that the applicant's permanent total disability

8

was caused by that industrial accident."

(R. 122; Appendix C at

7).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Worker's Compensation Act is legislation with

the humane purpose of protecting and providing compensation to
injured employees. The Act should be liberally construed to effect
this purpose.

The Administrative Law Judge erred when she failed

to consider this claim liberally and award benefits.

Construing

Ms.

burden

Cox's

claim

demonstrating

liberally,

that her

she

adequately

injuries

met

her

and disability were

of

medically

caused, at least in part, by her industrial injuries.
2.

Even if Ms. Cox's ability to work is affected by

"non-industrial"

factors,

she

qualifies

for

permanent

total

disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine.
ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1
The ALJ and the Industrial Commission applied the wrong
standard of causation to Applicant's disability.
In considering Ms. Cox's claims, it must be remembered
that

the Worker's

Compensation Act

should be given a

liberal

construction in order to fulfil its purpose of protecting employees
and providing financial security.
Comm'n

of

Utah,

State

Tax Comm'n v.

685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984).

Industrial

This court has

recently reaffirmed this construction, holding that, M[i]n order to
9

fulfill the purpose of worker's compensation, 'the Act should be
liberally construed and applied to provide coverage' and any doubts
Luckau

v. Board

of

(Utah App. 1992)

(quoting

State

Tax

See

Industrial

should be resolved in favor of the applicant."
Review,

840 P.2d

Comm'n,

685 P.2d at 1053).

811, 815

also

McPhie

v.

Comm'n,

567 P.2d 153 (Utah 1977) .
In this case, the ALJ and the Industrial Commission did
not give the applicant the benefit of the doubt in any regards and
thus have defeated the purpose of this act, leaving Ms. Cox without
remedy.

There is substantial evidence that Ms. Cox's disability

was caused, in part, by her industrial accidents. Yet the issue of
causation gets muddied by Ms. Cox's pre-existing back conditions,
along

with

resulting

her
from

evident
her

emotional

disability.

and
The

sidetracked by these collateral issues.

socio-economic
ALJ

and

symptoms

Commission

got

Instead of giving Ms. Cox

the benefit of the doubt, the ALJ speculated on other factors which
might have caused her permanent total disability.
Giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt in these
circumstances, an award of benefits is appropriate.
court

has

held

that

"[pjolicy

considerations

Our Supreme
in

worker's

compensation cases dictate that statutes be liberally construed in
favor of an award."
Utah,

744

P.2d

Tisco
1340,

Intermountain
1343

(Utah
10

v.

Industrial

1987).

While

Comm'n

of

"policy

considerations have no application in
to

support

case.

an award...,"

id.

the

absence

of

any

evidence

(emphasis added), this is not such a

As can be seen in the statement of facts and the following

sections, there is substantial evidence that applicant's disability
was caused in part by her industrial accidents.

As such, the

benefit of the doubt should have been given to the applicant.

The

ALJ and Industrial Commission erred in failing to do so by applying
an incorrect burden of proving medical causation.
Ms. Cox's application for permanent and total disability
was denied because of the application of erroneous standards of
medical causation.1
existing

and

Ms. Cox has never asserted that her pre-

subsequent

medical

problems

are

not

partially

responsible for her disability and inability to work. However, her
industrial accidents have contributed to her permanent and total
disability, and thus are compensable.
The ALJ construed the issue in this case as "whether the
August 15, 1988 compensable industrial injury is the cause of the
applicant's current permanent total disability."
1

(R. 81; Appendix

The court in Allen
v. Industrial
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah
1986) set forth two causation requirements for a person with a preexisting condition. The first is legal causation, which dictates
that one must show that "[t]he employment contributed something
substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday
life..." Id at 25. Clearly, the ALJ found legal causation, but
denied benefits based upon medical causation. (R. 70, 81; Appendix
B at 7, 18). Legal causation was not disputed. See Appendix G.
(R. 16-8). Therefore legal causation need not be addressed.
11

B at 18)(emphasis added).
standard of exclusive

The ALJ's application of a causation

causation

does not conform to the standard

set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

Comm'n,

Other comments by the ALJ indicate that

she also applied a significant
violation of the Allen

v. Industrial

contribution

standard, again in

standard.

The Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's application of
this erroneous standard, itself applying a sicrnificant
standard,

contribution

stating that the "relatively small proportion of the

applicant's

impairment

that

was

attributed

to

the

industrial

accident ... is, in our view, insufficient to support a finding
that the applicant's permanent total disability was caused by that
industrial accident."

(R. 122; Appendix C at 7) .

Neither the

exclusive causation, nor the significant contribution standards
applied by the ALJ and Industrial Commission are found in Utah
workers' compensation law.
Where, as in this case, there is some medical causation
between the industrial accident and the disability, it is error to
deny benefits on the basis of finding other, concurrent,
significant

causations.

"Just

because

a

person

more

suffers

a

preexisting condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining
compensation.

Our cases make clear that

12

'the aggravation or

lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is
compensable."

Allen,

729 P.2d at 25.

To show medical causation, a claimant must "prove the
disability is medically the result of an exertion or injury that
occurred during a work-related activity."

Id.

at 27.

A claimant

does not have to prove that her disability was wholly caused by the
injury, but only has to show by a preponderance of the evidence "a
medically

demonstrable

causal

link

between

the

work-related

exertions and the unexpected injuries that resulted from those
strains."
that

Id.(emphasis

exclusive

standard.
causation

The Allen

added).

causation

is not

the

court further reiterated
proper medical

causation

"We are mindful that the key question in determining
is whether, given

exertion in fact contributed

this

body

and

to this injury."

this exertion,
Id.

the

at 24 (emphasis

and italics added).
This

court

most

recently

causation standard in Willardson

v.

U.A.R. 12 (Utah App. June 28, 1993).

reiterated
Industrial

this

medical

Commission,

216

In that case the petitioner

argued that because the ALJ prefaced his finding of no causation
with the word "significant contribution," that the ALJ applied an
erroneous causation standard.

This court held:

Petitioner correctly asserts that there is no
requirement in the applicable statute that the
work-related
activities
"significantly"
contribute to an injury in order for a
13

compensable industrial accident to occur. The
only requirement is that there be a medical
and
legal
causal
relationship
between
petitioner's
condition
and
work-related
activities, significant or otherwise.
Id.

at 14 (emphasis added).2
The petitioner's claim for disability in Willardson

ultimately

rejected

because

this court

found

was

that the word

"significantly" was unintended surplusage, and that the ALJ and
Commission

did

not in fact use a "significant contribution"

standard in finding medical causation.

Id.

However looking at

the ALJ and Commission's findings in the present case demonstrates
that a "significant contribution" standard was indeed applied.
Such an application violates the "medically demonstrable causal
link" standard set forth in Allen

and reaffirmed in

Willardson.

As outlined above, the ALJ relied upon the medical
panel's findings, which have not been challenged.

The medical

panel assigned Ms. Cox a 36% whole person impairment rating.

Of

that 36% whole person impairment, 2.83% is a result of the
industrial injury suffered on August 15, 1988 and 1.27% is a result
2

For further support of a non-exclusive or non-proportional

causation requirement, see

Virgin

v. Bd. of Review

of Indus.

Com'n,

803 P.2d 1284, 1288 n. 4 (Utah App. 1990), where this court noted
that Utah courts deny benefits only when "the disability was solely
the result of a pre-existing condition" and where "the disability
was due entirely
to a pre-existing condition."
Id.
(Citing
Lancaster

v.

Gilbert

Dev.,

736 P.2d 237

(Utah 1987); Olsen

Industrial
Comm'n, 776 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1989) aff'd,
P.2d 1098 (Utah 1990).
14

v.

797

of the industrial injury she suffered in December, 1987.

Nothing

has contributed to Ms. Cox's whole person impairment rating since
the industrial accident on August 15, 1988.

The medical panel

found that "there is a causal connection between the applicant's
symptoms" and the industrial accidents.

The ALJ found that Ms.

Cox's testimony that her condition worsened after her August 15,
1988 injury is supported by the medical records.
that Ms. Cox is "probably totally disabled."
findings, benefits were denied because

The ALJ found

Yet despite these

"there is alot

[sic] of

evidence that leads one to the conclusion that the August 15, 1988
injury

only

disability."

minimally

contributed

to

the

applicant's

(R. at 82; Appendix B at 19).

overall

Clearly, the ALJ

applied the more onerous and incorrect "significant contribution"
standard.3
Likewise

the

Industrial

Commission

erroneously

apportioned causation in its denial of benefits:
The relatively
small proportion
of
the
applicant's impairment that was attributed to
3

The defendant, in arguing to the Industrial Commission for
the application of as much as an exclusive or significant
contribution standard, admitted that Ms. Cox met the "medically
demonstrable link" causation standard. It argued to the Industrial
Commission that "The most that can be found are medical opinions
that said accident contributed to Applicant's overall disability."
(R. at 106; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Applicant's Motion for Review at p. 5, attached herein in appendix
E of the Addendum).
If the accident contributed to Ms. Cox's
disability, then benefits are appropriate.
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the industrial accident of August 15, 1988,
is, in our view, insufficient to support a
finding that the applicant's permanent total
disability was caused by that industrial
accident.
(R. 122; Appendix C at 7 ) .
Indeed, as noted above, the ALJ may have applied a sole
causation standard, clearly an incorrect burden, as seen in her
findings that:
Although some of the applicant's medical care
providers have pointed to the applicant's back
and neck problems and her loss of her job as
causes of her current disability, none have
indicated clearly that the industrial injuries
are the sole cause of her back and neck
problems and the loss of her job.
(R. 80; Appendix B at 17) (emphasis added).
The August 15, 1988 industrial accident is the "straw
that broke the camel's back."

Though the percentage of Ms. Cox's

whole person impairment attributable to the accident is less than
that attributed to her prior non-industrial accidents, it is the
August

15th

accident

that

made

her

body

dysfunctional

for

employment purposes, and rendered the applicant totally disabled.
The ALJ relied upon the fact that Ms. Cox continued to
work after her August 15, 1988 accident to show that her industrial
accidents did not result in her permanent disability.

(R. 91,

attached hereto in Appendix D of the Addendum; R. 82-84; Appendix
B at 19-21).

Such a finding is in error, as permanent total
16

disability benefits may be awarded even though a claimant

has

returned to work following the industrial injury.

Peck

v.

Eimco

Process

1987).

This

Equipment

Co.,

748 P.2d

572, 574

(Utah

principle was articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Norton
Industrial

Com'n,

v.

728 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Utah 1986):

With respect to the administrative law
judge's finding that Norton's continued work
for six years was proof that he was not
totally disabled in 1983f it should be pointed
out that that fact standing alone does not
foreclose Norton's claim. The administrative
law judge correctly considered Norton's return
to work as one factor to be weighed in
determining his disability. He erred when he
failed to consider the condition
under which
Norton continued his employment, as manifested
by his finding "the very fact that the
applicant continued to work in underground
mining for six years following his accident is
convincing evidence that his accident did not
render him permanently and totally disabled."
Norton's decision to return to work did not
automatically disqualify him from receiving
permanent total disability benefits, where the
facts indicate that throughout the remainder
of his employ he was not restored to health.
The evidence is undisputed that Norton spent
the last six of his working years in
considerable pain.
Id.
Likewise, the ALJ in the present case found that Ms.
Cox's condition worsened after her August 15, 1988 accident. (R.
82; Appendix B at 19) . She continued to work in pain by relying on
pain medications and curtailing virtually all other activities.
The medical panel found that "there is a causal connection between
17

the applicant's symptoms'1 and the industrial accidents. Id.

Based

upon such findings of fact, it was error for the ALJ and the
Commission to find that there was no medical causation between Ms.
Cox's industrial injuries and her permanent and total disability.

Issue No. 2
The applicant is entitled to permanent and total disability
under the "odd-lot" doctrine.
Likewise the ALJ and Industrial Commission failed to
liberally construe the Worker's Compensation Act in rejecting Ms.
Cox's claim that she was entitled to benefits under the "odd-lot"
doctrine.

Permanent total disability benefits should be granted

"[w]hen a relatively small percentage of impairment caused by an
industrial accident is combined with other factors to render the
claimant unable to obtain employment."

Zimmerman v.

Industrial

Comm'n of

Utah,

added).

These factors include a claimant's "age, education,

785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis

training and mental capacity." Marshall
P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1984).

v. Industrial

Comm'n, 681

"It is the unique configuration of

these factors that together will determine the impact of the
impairment on the individual's earning capacity."

Id.

There is no question that Ms. Cox is totally disabled and
unemployable.
disabled.

Ms. Cox has been declared by Social Security to be

(R. 54-55, 83; Appendix F at 2-3, Appendix B at 2) . Two
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independent functional capacity evaluations determined that Ms. Cox
cannot return to work.

(R. 76; Appendix B at 13.)

that Ms. Cox is "probably totally disabled."

The ALJ found

(R. 85; Appendix B at

22) .
The

ALJ

and

Commission

premised

their

denial

of

disability benefits upon other non-industrial factors which may
have contributed to Ms. Cox's inability to work.
include

depression,

polyarthritis,

fatigue,

polypharmacy,

degenerative disc disease.

hypothyroidism,

degenerative

joint

Such factors
fibromyalgia,
disease

and

(R. 77, 82, 84-5, 122; Appendix B at

14, 19, 21-22; Appendix C at 7) .

Further, the defendant asserted

in arguing against the motion for review that Ms. Cox's limited
high school education and her "lack of transferable skills, prior
back

surgeries, and other medical problems not related to her

industrial injury," contributed to her total disability.

(R. 105-

06; appendix E at 4-5).
Without

doubt

these

non-industrial

contributed to Ms. Cox's total disability.
question

that

Ms. Cox

is 36% whole

person

factors

have

Further there is no
impaired,

(R. 78;

Appendix B at 15) and that the last two incidents contributing to
this impairment rating were the industrial injuries she suffered on
December, 1987, and on August 15, 1988.
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Id.

Given these facts, Ms. Cox is entitled to permanent total
disability

under

the

"odd-lot" doctrine.

"Under the

odd-lot

doctrine, ... total disability may be found in the case of workers
who,

while

not

altogether

incapacitated

for

work,

are

so

handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any wellknown branch of the labor market."
Marshall,

681

Compensation

P. 2d

at

§ 57.51,

212;
at

2

Peck,

748 P.2d at 575
The

Larson,

10-164.24

Law

(1983)).

To

of

{quoting
Workmen's

qualify

for

benefits under the odd lot doctrine, an employee first must show
that "'he or she can no longer perform the duties required in his
Zupon

or her occupation.'"
37-8

v.

Industrial

(Utah App. Sept. 14, 1993) (quoting

1131).

Second,

rehabilitated.

the

Zupon,

employee

must

Commission,

221 UAR 37,

Zimmerman,

785 P.2d at

show

that

221 UAR at 38; Zimmerman,

she

cannot

be

785 P.2d at 1131.

The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
employee can perform steady work.

Id.

Ms. Cox qualifies for permanent and total disability
under the odd-lot doctrine.

She has a permanent impairment which

has been medically caused, at least in part, by an industrial
accident.

She is fifty-three years old, has minimal schooling, no

transferable

skills

problems as well.

and

severe

non-industrial

related

medical

These factors conspire to prevent her from

returning to the work force or from being retrained in a capacity
20

that could accommodate her impairment*
injuries

have medically contributed

Because her industrial

to her disability,

she is

entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

CONCLUSION
Applying improperly rigid and inaccurate standards, the
Commission failed to liberally apply the Worker's Compensation Act
to give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant.

This is in

direct contravention of the policies and ideals long ago embraced
by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.
The
Industrial

facts

as found

Commission

by

the

establish that Claudia Cox did meet

her

burden of demonstrating

by

the ALJ

and affirmed

that her injuries and disability

were

medically caused by her industrial injuries. Applying the correct
causation standard of "a medically

demonstrable

causal

Cox's industrial injuries caused her disability.

link,"

Ms.

The Industrial

Commission erred in denying benefits.
Even if Ms. Cox's ability to work is affected by "nonindustrial" factors, she nevertheless qualifies for permanent total
disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine." The industrially related
impairment, coupled with non-industrial factors, have rendered Ms.
Cox disabled and entitled to benefits.
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This Court is charged with correction of errors committed
by the Industrial Commission.

The undisputed facts of this case

justify a reversal of the Industrial Commission's order denying
Cox's

Motion

Industrial

for

Review.

Commission

with

This

Court

directions

should
to

remand

enter

an

to

the

award

permanent total disability benefits to Claudia Cox.
DATED this /^tfaty of October, 1993.

IfDJjtfcffD B. HJtVAS"
Attorney for A p p l i c a n t / P e t i t i o n e r

of
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Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 26(b), I hereby certify that
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mailed first class, postage pre-paid, this

(2- day of October,

1993, to the following parties:
Benjamin A, Sims, Esq,
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0250
Attorney for Industrial Commission
of Utah
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
P.O. Box 146611
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611
Attorney for Employers' Reinsurance Fund
Rinehart Peshell, Esq.
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL
7321 South State Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Utah Power
Enercp/^Mutual IrualSrance

f^^^^
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Injury arising out of or m course of employment.
"Act of God" is not by implication excluded
in Subdivision (5) of this section State Rd
Comm n v Industrial Comm n, 56 Utah 252,
190 P 544 (1920)
Where mine superintendent was killed by
holdup bandits as he entered store to purchase
cigar for his own use, his death was not compensable as "accidental" injury withm this section since in order to recover for accidental injury there must be some causal connection or
relation between act causing injury and employment or duties of injured employee
Westerdahl v State Ins Fund, 60 Utah 325,
208 P 494 (1922)
Where state road employee while working on
road sought shelter from storm and was struck
by lightning, the accident arose out of and in
course of employment State Rd Comm'n v Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 190 P 544
(1920)
Under Subdivision (5) although an employee
is employed on the day of an accident, it cannot
be said he is in the course of his employment
where he steps aside to engage in an altercation with some third person concerning a personal grievance wholly unrelated to matters
connected with his employment Wilkerson v

35-1-45

Industrial Comm n, 71 Ltah 355, 266 P 270
(1928)
Wife of deceased drugstore employee was not
entitled to compensation where she did not sustain burden of proving that typhoid fever was
result of injurv received in course of his employment Chase v Industrial Commn, 81
Utah 141, 17 P2d 205 (1932)
Death of beer truck driver after being taken
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in
his chest after making his second morning delivery, did not result from an accident arising
out of or in the course of his employment,
where substance of opinions of medical panel
was that death from coronary thrombosis with
myocardial infarction was not caused from the
exertion of deceased's work on that morning
Burton v Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353,
374 P2d 439 (1962)
Regular course of employment.
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident
while returning home from work was not killed
in an accident arising out of or in the course of
employment despite fact that decedent's hourly
wage had been increased due to location of construction site, increased hourly wage did not
constitute pav for travel time Barney v Industrial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P 2d 1271
(1973)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 C J S Workmen's Compensation § 1
A.L.R. — Suicide as compensable under
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A L R 3d
616
Workmen's compensation injury or death
due to storms, 42 A L R 3d 385
Workmen's compensation injury sustained
while attending employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the course of employment, 47 A L R 3d 566

Master and servant employer's liability for
injury caused by food or drink purchased by
employee in plant facilities, 50 A L R 3d 505
Workers' compensation law as precluding
employee s suit against employer for third person's criminal attack, 49 A L R 4th 926
Workers' compensation sexual assaults as
compensable, 52 A L R 4th 731
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
e= 47

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, m case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-67

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident,
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a findmg by the
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (0 (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312week entitlement, compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer
°r its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same
period.
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have
occurred:
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35-1-67

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation
and training of the employee.
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence,
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has
been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort
under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is
required in any such instance.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 116, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988,
ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last
amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, relating
to permanent total disability, effective July 1,
1988, and enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend-

ment substituted "$ 120" for "$110" in the first
sentence of the second paragraph.
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985,
ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon
approval by the governor, or the day following
the
constitutional time limit of Article VII,
Sec 8 w i t l o u t t h e
}
governor's signature, or in
fc he c a s e
/ * v e u t o ; J ^ Qdate of v e t ° ° V e m d e A
Approved March 18, 1985.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arm injuries.
Commencement of benefits.
Determination of character of disability.
Estoppel.
Eye injuries.
Findings.
Law in effect.
Maximum benefits.
Multiple injuries.
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Appendix B:
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 92000255
*
*
*

CLAUDIA COX,

Applicant,

FINDINGS OF FACT
*

vs.

*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

•

UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*
*

AND ORDER

*

Defendants.

*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * £ * *
HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August
5, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by
Edward B. Havas, Attorney.
The defendants were
Peshell, Attorney.

represented

by

Rinehart

The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability
benefits in relation to 3 industrial incidents occurring while the
applicant was employed by Utah Power and Light (one in December of
1987, and two others that the applicant feels caused her permanent
total disability, one on August 15, 1988 and one on July 9, 1990).
No application for hearing was filed with resepct to the December
1987 incident, but it has been dealt with through out the
litigation in this matter.
The carrier and the Employers
Reinsurance Fund deny that the applicant is permanently totally
disabled as a result of any of her work injuries. The carrier
argues that the 1988 and 1990 incidents contributed little to the
applicant's already impaired cervical and lumbar spine and the
carrier argues that the 1990 incident may be non-compensable. In
support of this argument, the carrier points out that the applicant
had all her spinal surgeries prior to the 1988 industrial incident
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and the carrier notes that the applicant continued to work until
July 1990. The applicant counters that the 1988 accident did
indeed significantly worsen her condition and that she continued to
work thereafter only because she maintained herself on pain
medication. Both the carrier and the Employers Reinsurance Fund
also question whether the applicant is truly unable to work at any
job. At the time of the hearing, the applicant was in the process
of appealing a denial of Social Security Disability benefits and
the Social Security Disability records and other vocational
assessment included in the medical record exhibit at the time of
the hearing suggested that the applicant could possibly still work.
However, just after the medical panel submitted its report to the
Commission, the applicant was awarded Social Security'Disability
benefits pursuant to an order dated December 21, 1992. The order
was presented to the ALJ on January 20, 1993.
At hearing, a joint medical record exhibit was not ready for
submission and instead a partial group of records were admitted
into evidence after much argument as to what records were
admissable.
The ALJ gave the parties an extension of time posthearing to submit the rest of the joint exhibit, but confusion
ensued when additional records were submitted by the applicant
without an indication as to whether the records were duplicative of
records already admitted and without an indication as to whether
the additional submissions had been agreed to by the carrier and
the Employers Reinsurance Fund. Finally, per a conference call in
early October 1992, the parties confirmed that all records that the
Commission had at that time were to be considered the joint exhibit
and the ALJ was informed at that time that there might be
duplicates in the records that had been submitted. Rather than
return the records to the parties to prepare an acceptable exhibit
without duplicates, the ALJ decided to weed out the duplicates
herself and after doing so, the ALJ admitted the medical record
exhibit and marked it as Exhibit A-l. The records reflected a
medical controversy regarding what portion of the applicant's
impairment was related to the industrial incidents. Therefore, the
ALJ determined that the matter would be referred to a medical panel
for additional input.
The medical panel report was received at the Industrial
Commission on December 16, 1992 and was distributed to the parties
on December 17, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections. Counsel
for the applicant filed objections and/or argument regarding the
report on January 4, 1993 and counsel for the defendant filed a
response to this on January 8, 1993. Counsel for the applicant
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filed a reply to the response and the Social Security Disability
award information on January 20, 1993. The matter was considered
ready for order on Jaunary 20, 1993.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Although the first relevant industrial event that is
involved in this claim did not occur until December 1987, the
applicant had a significant non-industrial injury to both her
lumbar and cervical spine in October of 1986 and did have back
treatment and possibly neck treatment by a chiropractor prior to
1986. A good portion of the medical records submitted deal with
the applicant's medical status prior to 1986 and the ALJ will
briefly review this chronologically.
The applicant began having unexplained right upper quadrant
pain as early as 1963 and she was finally hospitalized for this and
associated back pain in 1973. Through that time, it was thought to
be related to gastro-intestinal or gall bladder problems, but the
testing during the hospitalization failed to confirm any problem in
the stomach, kidneys, gall bladder or intestines.
From 1972
forward, the applicant7s regular family physician or physicians
practiced at the Emery Medical Clinic in Castledale, Utah. The
records from that clinic note that she was seen for
fatigue/anemia/depression and allergic rhinitits in 1973. In 1974,
she was seen for phlebitis and heart palpitations with chest pain.
In 1975, ovarian cysts were diagnosed and in 1977 the applicant
began to have excessive or unusual uterine bleeding. Additional
assessment and testing in 1982 and 1983 confirmed bilateral ovarian
cysts and continued prolonged bleeding. In 1977, the applicant
began working for Utah Power and Light in a clerical/accounting
position. In 1978, the applicant began to see a chiropractor at
Castle Chiropractic Center in Castledale, Utah. The chiropractor's
records note that the applicant first came in in September 1978 due
to a traumatic lumbo-sacral strain. She was seen approximately 2
times per week in September and October of 1978. She again sought
out chiropractic care in July of 1979 (once or twice per week) and
in late August of 1979 (almost daily). In October of 1979, the
applicant
was
seen
at
the
Emery
Medical
Clinic
for
anxiety/depression and she was prescribed limbitrol.
The applicant was seen at Castle Chiropractic Center in late
August 1980, almost daily, and again in late 1981 almost daily,
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tapering off in October and November of 1981. in September of
1981, the Emery Medical Center diagnosed acute otitis media with
perforation and the applicant was seen by Dr. G. Lund for a patch
on the perforation. From April of 1982 through October of 1982,
the applicant went to the chiropractor 2 to 4 times per month. In
1983, she was seen 2 to 4 times per month in February, June, July
and December. In 1984, the applicant was seen by Dr. C. Null, a
cardiologist, and he diagnosed a slight heart murmur.
The
applicant underwent breast reconstruction surgery in 1984. She saw
the chiropractor from mid-May 1984 through mid-June 1984, 3 times
per week, and then again in August of 1984, 2 times per week. In
October of 1984, the applicant had a complete hysterectomy and
oopherectomy at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City. At hearing,
the applicant recalled that she did not see the chiropractor for
back pain after her hysterectomy, but the records do indicate that
the applicant saw the chiropractor almost daily in late August of
1986, tapering off in September in 1986. In October of 1986, she
had her first significant cervical/lumbar injury.
On October 4, 1986, the applicant was in Albuquerque, New
Mexico on vacation at the hot air balloon festival. She was riding
in the back of a pick-up truck, on a gravel road, chasing a hot air
balloon when the truck hit a dip in the road. The applicant stated
that the truck was not going very fast and she was seated with her
legs straight out in front of her leaning on the the side of the
truck bed. As the truck hit the dip in the road, the applicant was
bounced up off the bed of the truck and she came down hard, still
in a seated position. The applicant described the effect on her as
a heavy impact and a very severe jolt. That afternoon or evening,
the applicant called a local chiropractor in Albuquerque and he
treated the applicant on an emergency basis, also providing her
with a back brace and a heel lift.
when the applicant returned to Utah, she went to see Dr. R.
Sanders at the Castle Chiropractic Center on October 9, 1986. Dr.
Sanders felt she had sustained multiple strains of the lumbar,
thoracic and cervical spine.
He began treating her with
chiropractic treatments.
The next doctor she saw for the
Albuquerque injury was Dr. G. Momberger, a Salt Lake City
orthopedist. She saw Dr. Momberger on October 28, 1986 and on an
intake form it is noted that she had injured her neck, spine, low
back, shoulders, knee and elbow. Responding to the cause of the
problem, the form indicates that the applicant was picking up a
suitcase and was bumped on August 16, 1986 (this incident was not
discussed at hearing), with the truck incident occurring 6 weeks
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later. The intake form also notes that BEFORE 1976 a Dr. Kazarian
had recommended surgery and Dr. Lamb had recommended exercise only.
There are no records from Dr. Kazarian or Dr. Lamb in the medical
record exhibit. The same form indicates that the applicant's low
back pain had begun in 1959. Dr. Momberger's notes indicate midthoracic pain and he referred the applicant to Dr. Ward at the
University to determine if possibly she had a connective tissue
disorder.
The next physician visit was on November 6, 1986, when the
applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Clinic for depression. It
was noted that the applicant had been followed weekly at a mental
health clinic for the last 6 months for depression which was
situational and related to various life set-backs. Desyrel was
prescribed. The applicant continued with chiropractic treatments
from Dr. Sanders through November 24, 1986, receiving an overall
total of 14 treatments between October 9, 1986 and November 24,
1986.
Dr. Sanders's records indicate that he referred the
applicant to Dr. L. Gaufin, at the Utah Neurological Clinc in
Provo, Utah, on November 24, 1986 and that Dr. Gaufin had a CT scan
done. This may be an error, because there is no record of a CT
scan in Dr. Gaufin's records or in the Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center records, the hospital at which Dr. Gaufin normally gets his
films. Dr. Gaufin did admit the applicant to Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center on December 2, 1986 for a myelogram and Dr. Sanders
may be referring to this film when he states a CT scan was
performed. After reviewing the myleogram results, Dr. Gaufin's
final diagnoses were: 1) acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy
secondary to centrally herniated L4-5 disc, 2) mild disc bulge L34, 3) cervical radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the
nerve roots C4-5 and C5-6 bilaterally. Upon discharge, on Decmeber
4, 1986, Dr. Gaufin prescribed tylenol #3. The applicant was seen
at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center several days later for what
Dr. Gaufin describes as a post-myelogram headache with neck pain.
The applicant was given dalmane and tylenol #3.
On January 5, 1987, Dr. L. Gaufin performed a semi-hemi
laminotomy, formainotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 on
the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. In February of
1986, Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Sanders that the applicant had improved
symptoms as a result of the surgery, but that she was still
protective and cautious about her back and used an L5 corset for
traveling.
He noted that he would consider operating on her
herniated cervical disc as soon as she stabilized from the lumbar
surgery. On March 4, 1987, Dr. Gaufin wrote State Farm Insurance,
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indicating that the October 4, 1986 truck accident had produced an
acute vertical load on the applicant's spine and subsequent
pressure on the discs which was totally compatible with the
symptoms she later suffered and the herniated lumbar and cervical
discs. He states in the letter that he did not operate on the L3-4
level because the applicant wanted to get as much wear out of that
level as she could before proceeding with surgery. He noted that
the applicant continued with neck, shoulder and arm symptoms and
with headaches when she was in a vertical position. He noted that
these symptoms were associated with the C4-5 and C5-6 discs and
that he had scheduled her for neck surgery. The applicant was
admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on March 9, 1987
and on March 10, 1987, Dr. Gaufin performed an anterior cervical
disectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion C4-5
and C5-6.
The applicant recuperated from March of 1987 until August
5, 1987 when Dr. Gaufin released her to return to work. During
recuperation, Dr. Gaufin prescribed soma and tylenol #3 and the
applicant went to the Emery Medical Clinic for estrogen supplements
and allergy medications. The applicant testified that she had
difficulty the first couple weeks back at work, but then got better
and had no problems doing her work duties.
Upon releasing the
applicant to return to work, Dr. Gaufin recommended that she
follow-up with her family physician for any medication refills she
might need. There are almost no doctor visits except for those
associated with medication refills at Emery Medical Clinic from the
date of release (August 5, 1987) until December 14, 1987 when the
applicant saw Dr. C. Null, a cardiologist, for lab tests.
Apparently, the applicant was concerned with fatigue or low energy
and Dr. Null confirmed with her that her test results were normal
and that he believed her energy level was being effected by her
recent surgeries and illnesses and that she should take vitamins.
It was during this same month, December 1987, that the
applicant had the first of her industrial injuries. The applicant
stated that she was at work and that she was wearing a long skirt
with a slippery slip underneath it. As she went to sit on her
chair, that had rollers on the legs, she caught just the edge of
the chair seat and then the chair rolled back and away from her as
she slid off the end of the seat. She apparently fell to the floor
on her buttocks and had resulting back pain and right leg pain with
muscle spasms. However, she had no doctor visits associated with
this incident. She did get a refill of soma on December 29, 1987
at Emery Medical Center, but there are no actual examinations or
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treatments for this injury. The applicant also missed no work time
and there is no Employers First Report of Work Injury for this
incident.

The applicant continued to work and was able to return to
most all activities after the 1987 surgeries. She stated that she
did avoid very jarring type activities, like aerobics and Jwheelers per Dr. Gaufin's instructions. She did all her housework
and she could drive, but she did avoid mowing the lawn per her
testimony. She had only 4 or 5 visits or calls to Emery Medical
Center from December of 1987 until August of 1988 <ind'th«»se w* ie
for prescription refills, only one of which was lor suina. on
August 15, 1988, the applicant had her second industrial incident.
She was working quickly as she was filling In for several other
workers that were off work at the time.
She was doing Carina
O'Brien's work for her and had to get into one of her file drawers.
The relevant drawer was the bottom drawer of a f i Le cabinet and was
the largest drawer in the cabinet. The drawer was filled with
paper and books, but the applicant did not know this. She was
bending over and pulling on the drawer handle, which was about a
foot off the floor, with her right hand, when the drawer partially
opened and then stopped abruptly like it was stuck. The applicant
stated that she felt something give in the middle of her back and
her ncick, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She also stated
that she felt her neck pop or give way, but that she was more
concerned at the time regarding her low back. She stated that
there was no one at work to fill in for her, so she remained at
work the remainder of the shift. She stated she continued to work
in pain and discomfort after the incident and just tried to ignore
"it,"
She testified that she took pain medications and muscle
relax€irs daily and would go strlight to bed after getting off work.
Once again, there are no immediate doctor visits a s s o c i a ted
with this injury. The applicant testified at hearing that she did
not want to see a doctor because she was afraid to find nit that
she had made her condition worse once again. The nearest-in-time
medical record is a refill of estrogen at Emery Medical Center on
August 30, 1988. The next doctor visit, on September 29, 1988,
relates to the need for mammography and the fact that the applicant
wanted her cholesterol checked. The office note for this visit
does mention that the applicant had reinjured her neck "the other
day" and needed a soma refill.
Fioricet was prescribed on
September 30, 1988. The first mention in the records of the
December 1987 injury and the August 15, 1988 injury is in Dr.
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Gaufin's office note dated October 3# 1988. In that note, he
refers to the sliding-off-the-chair incident (he indicates this was
in October of 1987 as opposed to December 198?) and the August 15,
1988 injury opening a heavy file drawer. The first incident he
notes gradually resolved, but he noted that the applicant continued
to have pain in the neck, shoulders and arms and numbness in the
first, second and third digits of both hands (right greater than
left) related to the August 15, 1988 incident. Some pain in the
lumbar area was also noted.
Dr. Gaufin wanted to rule out a
recurrent disc herniation in the cervical spine, and carpal tunnel
and thus he referred the applicant for an MRI and nerve conduction
velocity
tests and an EMG of the right upper extremity. On October
n
, 1988, that applicant had an MRI of both the cervical and lumbar
spine. The cervical film was read to show a stable fusion at C4-5
and C5-6, but degenerative disc disease at C6-7, producing a bartype defect obliterating the thecal sac and impinging the nerve
roots bilaterally, right greater than left. The lumbar film was
read to show no evidence of recurrent disc injury, with a mild
bulge at L^-SI which did not significantly impinge on the nerve
root or thecal sac. The nerve tests done at Western Neurological
Associates on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J.
Andrews.
The applicant *jot refills of soma and tylenol #3 at Emery
Medical Center on November 19, 1988. On November 23, 1988, Dr.
Gaufin wrote Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center indicating that he
did not recommend surgery at that time for either the neck or back.
He stated that he felt the applicant's 2 industrial injuries
(December 1987 and August 15, 1988) had agrravated a pre-existing
mild degenerative change at C6-7 and had created a mild bulge at
L5-S1,
FTP noted that the applicant might need surgery in the
future, but for the time being he recommended anti-inflammatory
medication, muscle relaxants and physical therapy as needed. In
December of 1988, the applicant got refills of fioricet, tylenol #3
and lomatil.
In January 1989, she was referred for physical
therapy, which she attended 5 times between January 19, L989 and
February 9, 1989. In March of 1989r the applicant got refills of
fioricet and seldane and there is an Emery Medical Center office
note dated April 13, 1989 that indicates that the physical therapy
had helped, but that the applicant wanted a soft cervical collar
and a lumbar support.
Tt was also noted that the physical
therapist had recommended a TENS unit and the applicant was fitted
for one in May of 1989. At hearing, the applicant testified that
the physical therapy made her feel sicker. She indicated that the
TENS unit helped sometimes. Although she continued to work, the
applicant stated that she had her daughter do her housework for
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her. She felt that she could not engage in her hobby of cake
decorating and recalls needing to lay down in order to have her
nails done, as this takes 2 hours. She stated that she tried to
strengthen her back by walking while wearing her neck brace and
that she tried to adjust her computer screen at work to make it
more comfortable for her. She also indicated that she needed to
lay town periodically at work:.
B = .ginning in mid-May 1989, the app] icant began to see an
acupuncturist, Kris Ahshi. Based on the brief handwritten notes of
the acupuncturist, the visits were not primarily for the neck or
back (these were mentioned i n the notes for just one visit), but
rather were for a host of other non-industrial problems including
fatigue, bloating/edema/water retention, sinus headaches, ear pain
and constipation. She had 6 or 7 treatments per month from June
1989 through September of 1989 (in July only one treatment) with
almost double that number of visits in October of 1989. During
that period, in addition to her acupuncture treatments, the
applicant was seen for various things at the Emery Medical Center
including assessment for hypothyroidism in June 1989 (unconfirmed),
for refills of tylenol #3, fioricet and soma in July 1989, for
fioricet and naprosyn in September 1989 and for fioricet in October
1989, and for cholesterol lab tests in September 1989. In November
of 1989, she was seen at Emery Medical Center for neck pain and
right arm pain and it was noted that she had been using a neck
brace for 2 months. It was recommended that she continue using the
brace and going to acupuncture. The 4 visits to the acupuncturist
i n November 1989 axe accompanied by notes indicating treatment for
cervical pain, tingling and numbness. The applicant got refills of
fioricet, naprosyn and soma on November 20, 1989 at Emery Medical
Center
On Decmeber 1, 3 989, the applicant was seen at the Salt Lake
Clinic by some physician for 1) hot flashes, 2) headaches, 3)
fatigue, 4) allergies and 5) left upper chest pain. The physician
noted that he would take some tests and he recommended that the
applicant cut her premarin intake in half and that she quit taking
provera altogether. From December 1989 through June of 1990, the
applicant went to the acupuncturist only twice (once in March 1990
and once in June 1990) and apparently got prescription refills only
at Emery Medical Center. Prescription refills included Zovirax,
fioricet (6 times), tylenol #3, naldicon, estrogen, soma (2 times),
naprosyn, amitriptyline and prozac. The applicant testified that
she actually worked overtime from January of 1990 through April of
1990 as another employee failed to return from maternity leave.

t\Cr.

"•^O'

ORDER
RE:

CLALL

PAGE 10

She indicated that tl lis extra effor t cai is< = < I her to t a k ^
medication and to use her neck brace agai n so that she could ^-ep
up with the work- In May of 1990, a visit to Emery Medical
er
notes pain down the right arm with numbness in the right aiy. s,
constant headache, and pain in the right leg with parasthesias in
the toes after walking, Her visit to the acupuncturist in June of
1990 was for leg swelling and pain. On July 2, 1990, Dr. Kotrady
of the Emery Medical Center wrote Dr. Gaufin, recommending that the
applicant be reevaluated by Gaufin. In that letter, he notes that
the applicant had persisting neck pain and that at one point she
had become dependent on fioricet, soma and tylenol #3. He notes
that she had been intolerant to prozac and amitriptyline and that
he recommended a pain clinic if surgery was not recommended. wo
noted that he felt there was an emotional stress component that
blocking any successful treatment.
On J HI :i Il y 9 , 199 0, just one week after Dr Kotrady sent his
letter to Di : Gaufin, the applicant had her final industrial
incident. The applicant stated at hearing that she was seated at
her desk and merely turned her head with resultant neck spasm and
symptoms on down her spine. It is somewhat unclear what exactly
happened at work after she turned her head.
There are some
references in the medical records regarding the applicant
collapsing on this date, but it is unclear: whether she did any more
than just lay down. She did go to the Emery Medical Center on the
same day and a cervical spine X-ray was done, which showed the
prior- fusion and the C6-7 degeneration
A n acute strain was
diagnosed, and soma and lortab were prescribed. Several days later
she was referred to physical therapy, but the applicant called to
tell the therapist she was to wait with the physical therapy until
she saw Dr. Gaufin per Gaufin#s instructions. On August 6, 1990,
the applicant went to see family practitioner, Dr. S. Potter, in
Price, Utah for hot flushes and headaches. He recommended a trial
of prozac and some lab tests. Apparently, she thereafter made Dr.
Potter her family doctor, but through the end of 1990 she continued
to get prescription refills at Emery Medical Center for both her
spinal problems (fioricet> soma, naprosyn, tyleonl #3) and for
other ^hings like anti-depressants (prozac and provor"a•
The applicant had a r epeat cer v ileal MRI doi le at Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center on August 9, 1 99 0 per Dr. Gaufin#s
referral.. This was read to show no major changes since the one
done on October 7, 1988. Dr. Gaufin saw her on August 15, 1990 and
he noted that she continued to have chronic neck, shoulder and arm
pain, with the pain being better when she was laying down and worse
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when she was sitting at work. He noted that she continued to use
the neck collar and his impression was acute chronic cervical
radiculopathy secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc
at C6-7 bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the
nerve roots, but he noted that the applicant would need to be very
careful in the future due to the propensity of deterioration of the
discs caused by stress on the joints due to a 3-level fusion. His
office note for October 7, 1988 indicates that the applicant would
consider whether to have the additional surgery. Dr. Gaufin's
letter to the carrier dated October 1 , 199 0 indicates that the
applicant opted to avoid surgery and he therefore recommended: 1)
avoiding jolting or jarring the neck, 2) use of a soft cervical
collar, 3) cervical traction taught by a physical therapist and 4)
anti-inflammatory medi cation and musel e re] axants with avol dance of
narcotics.
In December 1990, Dr. Taylor at the Emery Medical Center
wrote Dr. Gaufin requesting that he "do a disabiity determination11
: i i the applicant as he believed the applicant would not be a
dependable future employee. In response to this, the applicant saw
Dr. Gaufin again on January 9, 1991 and Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Taylor
a letter indicating that the applicant was at that time in such
intense pain that she could not tolerate sitting in a chair in
front of a table or a desk with her head flexed for 8 hours, n<;»
noted that her care options were surgery or conservative care, but
that nothing was going to totally "get rid" of the pain. He noted
that there was a general reduced success rate for 3rd surgeries and
that the applicant would experience a continued wearing out process
with age. He states in the letter that there would be a point at
which surgery would not help.
He found that the applicant
continued to be termporarily totally disabled and that she would
continue to use traction and see if she got her better enough to
return to work.
In January. 1991, Dr. Taylor again wrote Dr.
Gaufin asking him to rate the applicant. The applicant applied for
Social Security Disability on January 28, 1991 and got refills of
prozac, tylenol #3, soma, fioricet and naprosyn at the Emery
Medical Center on January 31 , . ••-; Dr Gaufin saw the applicant
for the last time on March 18, 1991 when he rated her as having a
33% whole person impairment due to her industrial injuries, a
combined rating of 20% lumbar and 16% cervical impairment. Not
included in his rating was a 7% whole person rating for the neck
and 8% fr^ w" ^ -,i^a>- spi ne d\ le to the surgeries i r. IQAT
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applicant's I : wo major1* complaints were: 1 ) constant neck pain with
numbness and tingling made worse by sitting, standing in one spot
and walking and made better by laying down with pillows under the
neck, pain medications and muscle relaxers and 2) constant back
pain from the mid-back to the low back radiating down her leg to
her toe, better when she was laying down, walking or taking
medication and generally more tolerable than the neck pain. He
found that the applicant was medically stable and that surgery was
advisable only if muscle atrophy occurred, muscle weakness became
progressive or a free fragment was discovered. He found surgery
was not advisable if the applicant merely had progressive pain
symptoms.
He found that the applicant had a combined total
impairment from both the lumbar and cervical spine of 34%. He
breaks this rating down, but his breakdown is a little confusing.
Nonetheless i t does appear that he feels that the vast majority of
the rating was caused *- * fc_ *--.r>' — •-ry and ensuing 1 987
surgeries.
,. < ai id J i i] y 1991 , the app] icant saw Dr. S Potter for
ssion and headaches and in July of 1991 the applicant returned
o u.r c, h i I for increasing symptoms of precordial pressure,
aching ana tightness seeming to occur with activity. His diagnoses
were: 1) mitral valve prolapse syndrome, 2) anginal syndrome, 3)
intermittent episodes of arterial hypertension in the past, 4)
prior spine injuries and 5) prior hysterectomy.
Dr. Null noted
that the applicant needed to get her cholesterol level down. The
applicant saw Dr , J. Heiner in August 1991, apparently to get a
second opinion regarding her neck and low back symptoms.
His
office note from this visit makes some observations, but there are
no real conclusions stated in the note. He did take lumbar and
cervical X-rays. Dr. Potter referred the applicant for acupuncture
again in September of 1991 and the applicant had 5 treatments in a
2-month period from mid-September 1991 through mid-November 1991.
On October 25, 1991, Social Security issued its initial decision
denying the applicant disability benefits. The order notes that it
was determined that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with
norma,. 1 breaks.
On November 7, ] 991, the applicant saw Dr. S. potter and he
noted a new symptom. The applicant was having difficulty closing
her hands. He referred the applicant for a rheumatoid factor ] ab
test and his November 21, 1991 office note inddicates that this
came back negative. He prescribed fioricet, physical therapy and
a nerve conduction velocity test. The applicant had 10 acupuncture
treatments from November 29, 1991 through December
l-^l
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December 20, 1991 Dr. J. Watkins, a nerurologistf wrote Dr. L.
Gaufin indicating that he had seen the applicant for a tingling
sensation in both hands and in the right arm along with
intermittent loss of grip and tingling in front of her left ear
which all began as of July 9, 1990.
Numbness in the first 3
digits of the hands was also reported along with occasional
drooling from the right side of the mouth. Dr. Watkins recommended
nerve conduction velocity tests, EMGs of both upper extremities and
an MRI of the brain. He wrote Dr. Gaufin on January 22, 1992 that
these tests came back normal. Dr. Potter refilled the applicant's
fioricet, tylenol #3, feldene, prozac and soma in January of 1992.
On February 6, 1992, Dr. Potter also prescribed desyrel for neck
symptoms and emotional stress and he informed the applicant's
attorney that the desyrel was related to her industrial injuries.
On March 1, 1992, he wrote the applicant's attorney and notified
him that the medications that he was refilling (prozac, feldene,
tylenol #3, fioricet and naprosyn) were all necessary due -to the
applicant's industrial injuries.
On March 5, 1992, Dr. Watkins wrote Dr. Gaufin and noted
that the applicant had also developed dizzy symptoms and that she
had gone off all medications and was trying meclizine for the
dizziness. On March 30, 1992, Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, wrote a
letter to-whom-it-may concern noting that he had seen the applicant
10 times in counseling and that the applicant had experienced some
improvement as a result, but continued to grieve over the loss of
her job and health.
He concluded that it was difficult to
accomplish much in therapy until the issue regarding, her Social
Security Disability was settled. He stated that he could see no
way that she would be able to return to work and he recommended a
speedy disability retirement. On March 31, 1992, a functional
capacity evaluation was done through Carbon Emery Physical
Therapy/Alta Health Services and this resulted in a classification
for the applicant of light/sedentary work. It was noted that the
applicant did not have good control of her pain and that she was
limited by this and her fear of reinjury.
On April 6, 1992, the applicant saw Dr. J. Matthews who
diagnosed her as having fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory
polyarthritis.
He noted that he wanted to rule out multiple
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothryroidism.
He referred the
applicant for lab tests and he did X-rays of her hands. He gave he
an injection of adlone and prescribed cyclobenzodrine. Dr. Potter
saw the applicant again on May 19, 1992 and he noted hand pain and
leg swelling and he noted a possible diagnosis of fibromyacitis and
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fatigue. He prescribed amitriptylline. The applicant was seen in
the emergency room of Castleview Hospital on May 31, 1992 for neck
and back pain and she was given an injection of demerol/phenergan
and was sent home with percocet. Dr. Matthews's office note for
June 1, 1992 adds two other diagnoses: hypothryroidism and chronic
pain. He prescribed synthroid in addition to the cyclobenzodrine
and indicated he would recheck her in 3 months. On June 29, 1992,
the applicant requested a hearing with Social Security in order to
reassess her entitlement to disability benefits.
There is a Career Guidcance Center report dated June 15,
1992 which concludes that there are jobs available for which the
applicant is trained, but that she may have difficulty finding an
employer willing to make the accommodations that are necessary in
order for her to tolerate the workplace. The applicant has been
receiving long term disability benefits since shortly after the
July 9, 1990 incident but it is unclear in what amount and how long
the benefits will continue. As of October of 1992, the Social
Security Disability litigation was still in progress with no final
result made known to the ALJ.
The applicant testified that since the July 9, 1990
incident, she was reduced to even less activity than she performed
after the August 15, 1988 accident. She characterized her activity
level as "totally down." She stated that she had a hard time even
walking and could do no housework. She stated that she wore her
neck brace for traveling and when she was unable to lay down. She
stated that she was unable to drive for one year as she could not
turn her head. At the time of the hearing, the applicant stated
that she had constant pain in her neck (she wore her cervical
collar at the hearing) and that she had reduced range of motion in
the neck due to pain when she tried to turn her head. She stated
that she had to lay still in the morning for a couple of hours
before she could move her head. She stated that she no longer
walks to help her back pain because this jars her neck. She stated
that she can sit or stand for only 30 minutes at a time before the
pain gets bad and then she needs to lay back, put her legs up or
use her neck brace. She stated that it is painful to have her neck
bent over looking at her desk or keyboard.
With respect to education ahd work experience, the applicant
stated that she graduated from South Emery Highschool in Ferron,
Utah and had only typing classes thereafter. She stated that she
worked for 20 years, initially as a retail sales clerk in a women's
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apparel store and later in several accounting/clerical positions.
She feels that her limited ability to sit with her neck bent over
a
desk
or
keyboard
prevents
her
from
returning
to
clerical/accounting work and she feels that she can no longer do
the bending, lifting, reaching and work on her feet that is
required in a retail sales clerk position.

The medical panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. Madison Thomas#
a neurologist and panel member Dr. B. Holbrook, an orthopedist.
Their report was received at the Commission on December 16, 1992.
The panel report concludes that there is a causal connection
between the applicant's symptoms and the three industrial injuries
at issue as well as a connection between her symptoms and preexisting conditions or injuries. The panel is not specific about
what symptoms it refers to, but the panel specifically talks about
neck symptoms with radiation and problems in the right upper
extremity and low back symptoms radiating into the right lower
extremity. The panel found that the applicant's December 1987 work
injury and the August 15, 1988 work injury did not result in any
temporary total disability, with the July 9, 1990 work injury
resulting in 3 or 4 weeks of temporary disability. With respect to
impairment, the panel apportioned the applicant's impairment as
follows:
prior to
1986

10-4-86

12-87

8-15-88

7-9-90

cervical
spine-17%

1.70%

11.90%

0.85%

2.55%

0.00%

lumbar
spine-14%

3.50%

9.80%

0.42%

0.28%

0.00%

hypothyroidism

5.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

10.20%

21.70%

1.27%

2.83%

0.00%

TOTAL

The panel concluded that the treatment that the applicant has had
was attributable to the accidents in the proportion represented by
the impairment percentages and that the applicant's psychological
status (depression with pre-existing personality disorder) was the
result of multiple non-industrial factors.
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On January 4, 1993, the ALJ received objections/argument
from counsel for the applicant. In that filing, counsel objects to
the panel's finding that no temporary total disability was
attributable to the 1988 accident and that only 3 weeks of
temporary total disability was attibutable to the 1990 accident.
Counsel cites the indications of inability to return to work made
by Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, in 1991 and 1992 as
support for this objection. Counsel also notes that the panel did
attribute some impairment to the 1987 and 1988 injuries and
suggests that temporary disability should be proportional to the
impairment noted by the panel. Counsel also argues that the panel
should have attributed at least some of the applicant's depression
to the industrial injuries since the social disruption that is
cited as part of the cause of the depression resulted due to the
applicant's loss of her job. Counsel for the defendants filed a
response to these objections on January 8, 1993 pointing out that
the July 9, 1990 injury is non-compensable as a result of the Allen
case and since the applicant discontinued work due to this noncompensable incident, any depression resulting therefrom is also
non-compensable.
On January 20, 1993, counsel for the applicant filed a reply
to the response filed by counsel for the defendants. That reply
indicates that the applicant is no longer contending that the July
9, 1990 injury is a separate compensable accident, but rather just
the date when the applicant discontinued work as a result of
injuries incurred in the 1987 and 1988 accidents. Attahced to the
reply of counsel for the applicant is the December 21, 1992 award
of Social Security Disability benefits. The decision notes that
the applicant was found to be first disabled as of July 9, 1990,
when she discontinued her work with Utah Power and Light. The
findings of the ALJ who issued the decision cite the following
impairments as the impairments that were relevant to the award of
disability benefits:
[A] history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987,
and cervical disk surgery in March 1987; post
traumatic right, greater than left hand numbness
with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain;
fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory polyarthritis;
polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenerative joint
disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and
passive dependent personality disorder.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

Adoption of Medical Panel Report;
The ALJ adopts the medical panel report to resolve the
issues of causation and impairment in this matter. The panel alone
has had access to all the applicant's medical records and thus the
panel report is the only expert medical evidence in this case that
is based on a complete medical history, as well as the applicant's
hearing testimony. Although some of the applicant's medical care
providers have pointed to the applicant's back and neck problems
and her loss of her job as causes of her current disability, none
have indicated clearly that the industrial injuries are the sole
cause of her back and neck problems and the loss of her job.
Therefore, there is no medical evidence that specifically refutes
the panel's findings. As it is the best founded and most complete
medical analysis in this case and as it is not specifically refuted
by any other evidence, the ALJ adopts the medical panel conclusions
as her own.

Compensability/Relevancy of the 3 Industrial Accidents:
The applicant did not file an application for hearing
regarding the December 1987 industrial accident. Technically, this
means that this accident is not part of the litigation that has
gone forward in this case. The applicant missed no time from work
as a result of this injury and saw no doctor specifically for this
injury. The panel found a .85 % whole person cervical impairment
and a .42% whole person low back impairment, or less than 2% whole
person impairment, resulting from this injury. Clearly, it is not
a significant injury and the applicant has not claimed it as having
caused her permanent total disability.
As such, the ALJ will
consider the injury irrelevant for purposes of analyzing the
permanent total disability claim.
The 1990 injury must be considered non-compensable. Per the
medical panel report, the applicant clearly had significant
permanent impairment to her cervical and lumbar spine at the time
of this injury. Therefore, per the legal causation requirements
outlined in the case Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15
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(Utah 1986), in order for the 1990 injury to be compensable, the
applicant must be able to show that the July 9, 1990 injury was
incurred pursuant to exertion greater than what is expended in nonemployment life by individuals in the latter part of the 20th
century. Since the description of the accident amounts to merely
turning her head, the injury is not a separate compensable
industrial accident.
In addition, the panel attributed no
impairment whatsoever to this incident. However, the ALJ should
note that the applicant appears to now indicate that she is not
claiming the July 9, 1990 incident as a separate compensable
accident (per counsel for the applicants January 12, 1993 letter
to the ALJ) , but rather that it is merely the date when she
discontinued working due to her earlier industrial accidents. In
essence, the applicant has withdrawn her claim that the July 9,
1990 incident is the cause of her permanent total disability. As
such, the ALJ will not consider the July 9, 1990 incident in
analyzing the applicant's claim for permanent total disability.
Based on the foregoing two paragraphs, only the August 15,
1988 accident is left as a possible industrial cause of the
applicant's claimed permanent total disability. There has been no
argument by the carrier that this incident was not a compensable
industrial accident and thus the ALJ finds that this case boils
down to a determination as to whether the August 15, 1988
compensable industrial injury is the cause of the applicant's
current permanent total disability.
The Cause of the Applicant's Permanent Total Disability:
In order to be entitled to permanent total disability
benefits, the applicant must be able to show that the industrial
injury at issue actually caused the permanent total disability.
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co. , 717 P. 2d 713 (Utah
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App.
1988) . The applicant's testimony, taken by itself, states that she
recovered, returned to work and to most activities after her 1986
non-industrial injury and her two 1987 surgeries that followed.
The applicant testified that after the August 15, 1988 industrial
injury, she became considerably worse and was forced to work in
pain with the assistance of medication. She indicated that she
needed to lay down periodically during the day, and especially
after work. Per the applicant, she needed help with her housework
and needed to use a neck brace in order to walk for exercise. All
of these things the applicant attributes to the effects of the
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August 15, 1988 injury, as she was not experiencing these
limitations just prior to the August 15, 1988 injury. In addition,
the applicant claims that her limitations actually became more
severe after the July 9, 1990 incident where she turned her head at
work. The applicants testimony that she was worse after the
August 15, 1988 injury is supported in the medical records by an
indication of increase medication usage after that injury. Also,
the records suggest increased complaints of neck and arm symptoms
in late 1988 and in 1989.
Looking at just the applicants testimony, there is
certainly an argument that the applicant's disabling symptoms
gradually increased after the August 15, 1988 injury, thus strongly
suggesting that the August 15, 1988 injury was the cause of her
eventual complete disability beginning in July of 1990. However,
there is alot of other evidence that leads one to the conclusion
that the August 15, 1988 injury only minimally contributed to the
applicant's overall disability. First, following the 1986 nonindustrial injury at the balloon show in New Mexico, the applicant
had two separate surgeries on her spine and was off work for a
total of 7 to 8 months. In contrast, neither the 1987 nor the 1988
injury resulted in any immediate need for medical care and both
involved no lost work time. No new objective findings on the
applicant's X-rays were noted as a result of these two injuries.
Also, the applicant was working overtime as late as 1990. The
obvious conclusion from this comparison is that the 1986 nonindustrial injury was much more significant medically than were the
1987 and 1988 industrial injuries. The minimal significance of the
two industrial injuries is also supported by the medical panel
impairment ratings, which attribute 80% of the applicant's neck
impairment and 95% of the applicant's low back impairment to causes
other than the industrial injuries.
Secondly, the medical records reflect a number of nonindustrial medical problems that the applicant was experiencing in
1988, 1989 and 1990. These other problems, some of which required
significant treatment, could have affected the applicant's ability
and motivation to continue working.
The applicant saw the
acupuncturist, Dr. Kotrady and Dr. Potter for fagtiue, bloating,
sinus headaches, ear problems, hot flushes, drug dependency and
high cholesterol.
In addition, Dr. Matthews diagnosed
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis and hypothroidism in 1992 and he did
not mention that any of these were related to the applicant's
industrial injuries.
Finally, the applicant was treated
sporadically both before and after the industrial injuries for
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depression/anxiety.
Certainly, this condition must effect the
applicants motivation to continue working. There is no medical
opinion that this problem is solely caused by the industrial
injuries. The medical panel found that the applicant may need
psychiatric care at this point, but that this is the result of
multiple non-industrial factors.
Lastly, there is the Social Security Disability decision to
consider. This decision lists 10 separate medical problems that
contribute to the applicant's disability status (see quote in
Findings of Fact). Four of the problems are clearly unrelated to
the industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries, hypothyroidism,
depression and passive dependent personality disorder). There is
a possiblity that the industrial injuries may have contributed in
some degree to the remaining 6 problems listed, but there is no
medical evidence that in fact this is the case.
The medical
records simply do not resolve what has caused or even aggravated
the hand problems, the fibromyalgia, the polyarthritis, the
polypharmacy, the degenerative joint disease or the degenerative
disc disease. Even if one presumed that all of these conditions
were aggravated by the industrial injuries, the medical panel
report indicates that the medical care for these problems is
attributed to the industrial injuries in the same percentages that
is reflected by the impairment percentages.
Once again, even
making a presumption heavily in favor of the applicant, without any
real supporting evidence for such a presumption, the result is that
the industrial injuries contributed little to the need for medical
care related to these problems.
The ALJ feels that there are cases where industrial injuries
involving minimal impairment aggravate pre-existing medical
problems sufficiently to support a finding that the injuries caused
the permanent total disability. There is certainly some merit to
the "straw-that-broke-the-camel's-back" theory. However, there
needs to be more than just the applicant's testimony to support
such a theory.
If one can show that there was an need for
increased immediate medical care or a clear period of disability
and inability to work that followed the industrial injury, then the
actual impairment percentage attributed to the industrial injury
takes on less significance. In this case, as discussed above,
those other factors are not present so as to allow the ALJ to
discount the minimal impairment that the industrial injury or
injuries caused. In addition, the applicant had significant preexisting impairment in the same areas of the body that the
applicant currently indicates are the source of her disaiblity and
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there are many non-industrial injuries that appear to be
influencing her overall disability.
The ALJ finds that the
preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the
August 15, 1988 injury is the cause of her current permanent total
disability.
The Objections to the Medical Panel Report;
The applicant's attorney objects to the panel's finding that
no temporary total disability (TTD) is attributable to the 1987 or
1988 injuries. Counsel suggests that the panel should* have found
TTD in proportion to the impairment rated by the panel for the
industrial injuries. However, the ALJ believes the panel found no
TTD related to these injuries simply because the facts of the case
reflect that the applicant just kept working after both the 1987
and 1988 injuries. The panel felt there was only TTD of 3 or 4
weeks following the July 9, 1990 incident and the panel was
unwilling to consider this as caused by the 1987 or 1988 injuries.
There is certainly nothing inconsistent in stating that the 3 or 4
weeks of disability following the July 9, 1990 incident was caused
by the July 9, 1990 incident. To the ALJ, the panel's findings
related to the TTD are entirely consistent and logical. Finally,
it is true that Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane felt the applicant
was disabled in 1991 and 1992, but neither definitively states this
was due to the only compensable injury at issue, the August 15,
1988 accident. As such, the panel's conclusions regarding the TTD
are not refuted by either Dr. Gaufin or Delvin McFarlane.
Counsel for the applicant argues that some portion of the
applicant's depression must be attributed to the applicant's August
15, 1988 industrial injury, because the panel admitted that social
disruption caused by loss of her job was contributing to her
depression.
However, it has not been established that the
applicant lost her job due to the August 15, 1988 industrial
injury. She worked for nearly 2 years following that injury and
thus there is not even a temporal inference that can be made with
respect to the 1988 injury causing the discontinuance of work. The
ALJ finds that the applicant may have stopped working due to the
July 9, 1990 injury, but this is not clearly established as counsel
for the defendants suggests in his response to the applicant's
objections. More than likely, there are a number of reasons for
the applicant's decision to stop working in July of 1990. As the
applicant was being treated for depression as early as 1973, and as
her cessation of work has not been clearly linked to the 1988
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accident, the ALJ does not find inconsistent the panel's conclusion
that the depression is the result on multiple non-industrial
factors.
Concluding Remarks:
The ALJ makes no separate finding with respect to the
applicant's ability to work at this point. It is unnecessary to
rule on this issue since the ALJ finds that any disability that may
exist is not attributable to the August 15, 1988 industrial
accident. However, just as commentary, it does appear that the
applicant is probably totally disabled due to multiple factors as
noted in the Social Security decision.
Because the ALJ feels
sympathy for the applicant and the difficult time she has had, the
ALJ wishes she could just accept the applicant's testimony and
award benefits. Unfortunately, the ALJ feels she cannot ignore the
other substantial evidence that does not support the applicant's
theory of the cause of her disability. The ALJ considered awarding
the applicant just the very minimal permanent partial impairment
(PPI) that is supported by the medical panel report, but it appears
that the carrier has paid alot more TTC (from July 10, 1990 through
March 4, 1991) than is supported by the panel report and this
completely offsets any PPI that would be payable.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for
permanent total disability benefits and any alternative claim for
temporary total compensation or permanent impairment benefits
associated with the industrial injuries of August 15, 1988 and July
9, 1990 is dismissed with prejudice.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600
CLAUDIA COX,
Applicant,

*
*
*

*
*

v.

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

UTAH POWER & LIGHT, ENERGY
MUTUAL INSURANCE and EMPLOYERS'
REINSURANCE FUND,
Respondents.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*

*

!

Case No. 92000255

?-/5 IS

*
*

The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the
motion for review of respondent in the above captioned matter,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63
-46b-12.
The provisions of U.C.A. Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are
applicable in this case.
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the
commission.11 U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 (1953).
The statutes further provide that:
A substantial compliance with the requirements of
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give
effect to the orders of the commission, and they
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void
for any omission of a technical nature.
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953).
The Commission has "the duty ... and ... full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to ... administer and enforce all laws
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1) (a) (1953), and to "consider
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953).
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88
(1965) which provides:
...The commission may make its investigation in
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of
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the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearings, and
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision. This
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the workers'
compensation act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules.
Id.
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena.
The applicant filed this motion for review challenging the
ALJ's ruling that she failed to prove that her permanent total
disability ("PTD") was caused by her industrial accident of August
15, 1988. The applicant argues that she is entitled to benefits
because she showed a "medically demonstrable causal link" under
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) between
her August 15, 1988 industrial accident and her disability. The
respondent asserts that Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d
954 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) requires that a claimant "prove medically
that his disability was caused by an industrial accident."
Finally, the applicant asserts that under the odd-lot doctrine, she
is entitled to PTD benefits.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Supreme Court held
that a claimant for workers' compensation benefits who has a preexisting condition must prove both legal and medical causation1
before he is entitled to benefits. The Court discussed the causal
connection required to sustain a claim for permanent total
disability benefits in Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717
P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). Hodges requires that a claimant for
permanent total disability benefits prove that his disability was
caused by an industrial accident. Id. at 721. The Utah Court of
Appeals applied Allen and Hodges to sustain the commission's denial
of benefits to a PTD claimant whose disability was determined to be
the result of pre-existing conditions and not an industrial
1

Legal causation requires a showing that the employment
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already
faced in everyday life because of his pre-existing condition.
Medical causation requires a showing that the disability is
medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during
work related activity. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d
15, 27 (Utah 1986).
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accident. Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1988)•
It is important to note that there is a distinction between
the terms "impairment" and "disability." "Impairment" is a medical
appraisal of the "nature and extent of the patient's illness or
injury as it affects his personal efficiency in one or more of the
activities of daily living." "Disability" is the worker's
impairment of earning capacity. Northwest Carriers, Inc. v.
Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140, n. 3 (Utah 1981). A
determination of whether a claimant is permanently and totally
disabled is a question of fact.
On review, an ALJ's
determination of factual issues must be supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776
P.2d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). We will review the record to
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ's finding that the applicant did not become
permanently and totally disabled as a result of her August 15, 1988
industrial injury.
Review of the medical records shows that the applicant first
sought chiropractic care from Castle Chiropractic for lumbo-sacral
strain in September 1978. She continued to see her chiropractor as
needed through November 1991. In October 1986, the applicant was
riding in the back of a pickup truck chasing a hot air balloon in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, when the truck hit a dip in the road which
caused her to bounce up off the bed of the truck and land hard on
her buttocks in a seated position. She sought emergency
chiropractic care that evening at Care More Chiropractic in
Albuquerque, and was provided a back brace for her trip home to
Utah.
Upon her return, the applicant was treated by Dr. R. Sanders
at Castle Chiropractic Center. Dr. Sanders referred her to Dr.
Gaufin at the Utah Neurological Clinic on November 24, 1986. Dr.
Gaufin diagnosed acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary
to a centrally herniated L4-5 disc, mild disc bulge L3-4, cervical
radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve roots at C45 and C5-6 bilaterally and prescribed pain medication. Dr. Gaufin
performed a semi-hemi laminotomy, foraminotomy and nerve root
decompression at L4-5 on the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center on January 5, 1987. He performed an anterior cervical
discectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion at
C4-5 and C5-6 on March 10, 1987.
The applicant was released to return to work on August 5, 1987
and sought follow up care with her family physician at Emery
Medical Clinic. The medical records show that the applicant saw
her doctor primarily for medication refills during the period from
August 5, 1987 to December 14, 1987.
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Sometime during December 1987, the exact date is not noted in
the record, the applicant suffered the first of three alleged
industrial injuries. As she attempted to sit at her desk, her
chair which was equipped with wheels, rolled away and she fell to
the floor landing on her buttocks. The applicant sought no
immediate medical care as a result of this fall, but did refill her
prescription for Soma on December 29, 1987. The applicant missed
no work and no Employer's First Report of Injury was filed for this
incident. The application for a hearing alleged that the applicant
suffered industrial accidents on August 15, 1988 and July 9, 1990.
The ALJ considered the December 1987 injury irrelevant to the
applicant's PTD claim.
A second industrial incident occurred on August 15, 1988. The
applicant was doing work for one of her co-workers, Carma O'Brien,
who was off that day. As the applicant attempted to open the
bottom drawer of Ms. O'Brien's file cabinet, the drawer stuck and
the applicant felt something give in the middle of her back, and
her neck, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She completed her
shift on August 15, 1988 and continued to work thereafter. The
applicant testified that, following this accident, she took pain
medications and muscle relaxants daily and went straight to bed
after work. There were no immediate doctor's visits associated
with the August 15, 1988 injury.
The first mention of the December 1987 and August 15, 1988
accidents in the medical records was in Dr. Gaufin's office note
dated October 3, 1988. Dr. Gaufin referred the applicant for an
MRI of her cervical and lumbar spine. The cervical films were read
to show a stable fusion at C4-5 and C5-6, and degenerative disc
disease at C6-7, producing a bar type defect obliterating the
thecal sac and impinging on the nerve roots bilaterally, greater on
the right than the left. The lumbar films showed no evidence of a
recurrent disc injury, but a mild bulge not impinging on the nerve
root or thecal sac was noted at L5-S1. Nerve conduction tests
performed on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J. Andrews
at Western Neurological Associates. In a November 23, 1988 letter
to Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center, Dr. Gaufin opined that the
applicant's industrial accidents had aggravated a pre-existing mild
degenerative change at C6-7 and created a mild bulge at L5-S1.
Conservative treatment was recommended.
The applicant continued to use pain medications and muscle
relaxants. She also tried physical therapy and acupuncture for
pain control. The applicant continued to work, although she
testified that her daughter helped with housework and she was
unable to engage in her hobby of cake decorating. However, the
applicant worked overtime between January and April of 1990 after a
co-worker failed to return from maternity leave. In May 1990, the
applicant complained of pain down her right arm, numbness in her
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right hand, constant headaches, and pain in the right leg with
parasthesias in the toes after walking. Dr. Kotrady wrote Dr.
Gaufin on July 2, 1990 recommending that the applicant be
reevaluated by Gaufin. Kotrady stated that he would recommend a
pain clinic if Gaufin determined that surgery was not the
recommended course of treatment. Dr. Kotrady believed that there
was an emotional stress component blocking successful treatment of
the applicant's symptoms.
On July 9, 1990, the applicant suffered her final industrial
incident. She was sitting at her desk and turned her head,
bringing on muscle spasms in her neck and spine. The applicant
went to the Emery Medical Center that day and a cervical X-ray was
made which showed no changes from previous studies. An acute
strain was diagnosed and Soma and Lortab were prescribed. Physical
therapy was postponed until after the applicant saw Dr. Gaufin. An
MRI was done on at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on August 9,
1990. The MRI showed no major changes since the previous MRI
performed on October 7, 1988. This incident is not a compensable
industrial accident under Allen, because the applicant's employment
did not contribute anything substantial to increase the risk she
already faced in nonemployment life.
Dr. Gaufin examined the applicant on August 15, 1990. He
opined that the applicant had acute chronic cervical radiculopathy
secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc at C6-7
bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the nerve roots,
but the applicant did not want surgery at that time. Dr. Gaufin
recommended that the applicant avoid jolting or jarring the neck,
use of a soft cervical collar, cervical traction taught by a
physical therapist, and anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxants. In
January 1991, Dr. Gaufin gave the applicant a 33% whole person
impairment rating due to her industrial injuries.
On April 29, 1991 Dr. Harris examined the applicant upon the
insurance carrier's request. He gave the applicant a 34%
impairment rating, but apportioned the majority of the rating to
1986 nonindustrial injury and subsequent surgeries.
The applicant saw Dr. Potter for depression and headaches in
June and July 1991. On October 25, 1991 the applicant's request
for Social Security disability benefits was denied. The Social
Security Administration determined in an order dated October 25,
1991, that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with normal
breaks. The applicant saw Dr. Potter on November 7, 1991, and he
noted that the applicant was having problems closing her hands.
Dr. Watkins, a neurologist, saw the applicant on December 20, 1991.
He ordered a nerve conduction velocity test, EMG's of both arms and
a MRI of the brain, all of which were within normal limits. On
March 5, 1992, Dr. Watkins reported that the applicant had
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developed dizziness, had gone off all medications, and was taking
meclizine for the dizziness.
A March 31, 1992 functional capacity evaluation at Carbon
Emery Physical Therapy classified the applicant for light/sedentary
work. The report noted that the applicant was not in control of
her pain and was limited by her fear of reinjury. Dr. Matthews
diagnosed the applicant with fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory
polyarthritis on April 6, 1992. He also tested her for multiple
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothyroidism. He returned a
diagnosis of hypothyroidism and chronic pain on June 1, 1992. Dr.
Potter, on May 19, 1992, noted hand pain, leg swelling and
diagnosed possible fibromyacitis and fatigue.
A Career Guidance Center report dated June 15, 1992 concluded
that there were jobs available for which the applicant was trained,
but that it might be difficult for the applicant to find an
employer willing to accommodate her disabilities. The applicant is
a high school graduate with a 20 year work history in retail sales,
accounting and clerical positions. She believes that she can no
longer perform these types of work due to her inability to sit and
work for long periods at a desk or to bend, lift, reach and stand
as required in retail sales.
The ALJ referred this matter to a medical panel for an
apportionment of the applicant's impairment among several possible
causes. The medical panel attributed 1.27 % of the applicant's
permanent impairment to her December 1987 accident, 2.83% of the
applicant's permanent impairment to her August 15, 1988 accident,
and 33.17% to various pre-existing causes. No permanent impairment
was attributed to the July 9, 1990 incident. The medical panel
further concluded that the applicant's depression and pre-existing
personality disorder were caused by non-industrial factors.
The applicant received Social Security disability benefits
pursuant to a decision dated December 21, 1992. The decision
stated that the following impairments were relevant to the award of
disability benefits:
[A] history of lumbar disc surgery in January
1987, and cervical disc surgery in March 1987;
post traumatic right, greater than left, hand
numbness with decreased grip and intermittent
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism;
degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc
disease; depression; and passive dependent
personality disorder.
The Social Security Administration decision lists 10 separate
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medical problems which contribute to the applicant's disability
status. Four of those medical problems are clearly unrelated to
the applicant's industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries,
hypothyroidism, depression and passive dependant personality
disorder). The industrial injuries may have contributed to the
other six conditions, but the medical evidence does not show a
causal connection between the applicant's hand problems,
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis, polypharmacy, degenerative joint
disease, and degenerative disc disease and the applicant's
industrial accident of August 15, 1988. The medical panel assigned
95% of the applicant's 14% lower back impairment and 80% of the
applicant's 17% cervical spine impairment to the applicant's
balloon chasing accident and other pre-existing impairments. The
relatively small proportion of the applicant's impairment that was
attributed to the industrial accident of August 15, 1988, is, in
our view, insufficient to support a finding that the applicant's
permanent total disability was caused by that industrial accident.
Therefore, the applicant has not proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that her disability was caused by her industrial
accident of August 15, 1988. Therefore, under Hodges and Large,
she is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The
applicant's claim for permanent total disability benefits under the
odd-lot doctrine likewise fails due to the lack of a causal
connection between the industrial accident and her permanent total
disability. We therefore, find that the ALJ's finding that the
applicant is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits is
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge
dated February 4, 1993 is hereby affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days from the date of this order,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86,
and 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security, 201
Ut. Adv. Rep. 79 (CA 12/04/92). The requesting party shall bear
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all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals
purposes.

\ f\
S t e p h e n M. Hadleyu
Ch a i rfrta n
/?
/ /
Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
~-f~cS's'<' s,

>4

p- v y

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner
Certified this
ATTEST:

day of

J.
Patricia 0. Ashby
/
Commission Secretary

///? \: /•'

1993

>v

c-^h

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of CLAUDIA COX, Case Number
92000255, on J-fL+xiav of /ZjA^Ji^f
, 19_£3. to the following:

CLAUDIA COX
P O BOX 273
ORANGEVILLE, UTAH 84537
RINEHART PESHELL, ATTORNEY
73 21 SOUTH STATE
MIDVALE UT 84047
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE
P O BOX 27008
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84127-0008
ERIE V. BOORMAN, ATTORNEY
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND
EDWARD B. HAVAS
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
2020 BENEFICIAL LIFE BUILDING
36 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

Adell Butldr-Mitchell
Paralegal
General Counsel's Office
Industrial Commission of Utah

Appendix D:
Letter Dated March 9, 1993 from A U
to Petitioner's Counsel

State of Utah
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ADJUDICATION DIVISION

vr

Timothy C. Allen
Michael O Leavitt
Governor

Presiding Administrative Low Judge

Stephen M Hadley

160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
(801) 530-6800
(801) 530-6804 (Fax)

Chairman

Thomas R Carlson
Commissioner

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner

March 9 ,

1993

EDWARD HAVAS
ATTORNEY

2020 BENEFICIAL LIFE TOWER
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
Re: Claudia Cox
Inj: 8-15-88
Emp: Utah Power & Light
Dear Mr, Havas:
I have received your Motion for Review for the abovereferenced matter and I will not be altering my order based on the
issues you raise in that Motion. There is no question that the
industrial injury caused impairment, but the issue in this case is
whether it caused her to become permanently totally disabled and
there were many other non-industrial factors involved in her final
decision to cease working. You indicate a number of times in your
Motion that some of the Social Security diagnoses were PROBABLY
caused by the industrial injury. I found only that there was a
POSSIBILITY of this, but no medical evidence to suggest any more
than this. Finally, I do not believe that the 1988 accident was
the straw that broke the camel's back. The applicant worked for
two years after the 1988 accident and had many non-industrial
medical problems during this time.
BY A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO MR. PESHELL AND MR. BOORMAN, I AM
NOTIFYING THEM THAT THEY HAVE 15 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS LETTER
TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION FOR REVIEW. AT THE EXPIRATION OF THAT
TIME PERIOD, I WILL FORWARD THE MATTER ON TO THE COMMISSION FOR A
FINAL RULING.

£.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
cc:

Claudia Cox, P O Box 273, Orangeville, UT 84537
Rinehart Peshell, Attorney, 7321 South State, Midvale, UT
84047
Energy Mutual Insurance, P O Box 27008, SLC, UT 84127-0008
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator, Employers Reinsurance
Fund
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Appendix E:
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
to Applicant's Motion for Review

Rinehart L. Peshell, 2573
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL
7321 South State Street
Midvale, UT 84047
(801) 255-3591
Attorney for Defendants
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
-ooOooCLAUDIA COX,
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION
TO APPLICANTS MOTION FOR
REVIEW

Applicant,
vs.
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/
ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,

CASE NO.

92000255

Defendants.

Defendants Utah Power and Light and Energy Mutual Insurance
Company, by and through their attorney Rinehart L. Peshell, hereby
submit their Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Applicant's Motion For Review.
FACTS
The

following undisputed

facts are essential

in order to

properly consider whether Applicant's Motion For Review should be
granted.
1.

Commencing in 1978 through August and September 1986,

applicant was treated by a chiropractor for back pain.

See Exhibit

oc

"A" attached hereto, p. 1-2.
2.
treated

During that same period
for

phlebitis,

fatigue,

heart

palpitation

complete hysterectomy.
3.

anemia,

of time, Applicanc was also

depression,

with

chest

allergic

pain

rhinitis,

and underwent

a

See Exhibit "A" p. 1-3

On October 4, 1986, Applicant was involved in a non-

industrial accident which injured her back and eventually resulted
in

surgery

on

January

5,

1987, when

a

semi-hemi

laminotomy,

foraminotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 was performed.
On March 9, 1987, Applicant underwent, as the result of the October
4, 1986 accident, an anterior cervical diskectomy with nerve root
decompression and interbody fusion C4-5 and C5-6. See Exhibit "A,"
p. 4-6.
4.

In

December,

1987,

applicant

suffered

her

first

industrial injury; but saw no doctors and missed no work time as
a result of said accident.
5.

See Exhibit "A," p. 6-7.

On August 15, 1988, Applicant bent down to pull out a

bottom drawer of a file cabinet.

The file drawer which was filled

with papers and books, stopped abruptly as it was being opened and
something gave in the middle of applicant's back.

See Exhibit !iA,fl

p. 7.
6.

Thereafter, Applicant, although her condition seemed to

worsen, continued to work and even worked overtime from January

1990 through April 1990.
7.

See Exhibit "A," p. 9.

On July 9, 1990, applicant turned her head while at work

and suffered a resultant neck spasm and symptoms on down her spine.
See Exhibit "A," p.10.
8.

Said

incident was found to be non-compensable.

See

Exhibit "A," p. 18.
9.
sensation

After
in

July
both

9,

1990,

hands

and

Applicant
in

the

suffered

right

arm

a

tingling

along

with

intermittent loss of grip, tingling in front of her left ear and
numbness in the first 3 digits of the hand-

See Exhibit "A,11, p.

13.
10.

On

fibromyalgia,

April

6,

fatigue,

1992,

Applicant

hypothyroidism

and

was

diagnosed

chronic

pain.

with
See

Exhibit "A," p. 14.
11.

Applicant was reduced to even less activity, as a result

of the July 9, 1990 accident, than she performed after the August
15, 1988 accident.
12.

See Exhibit "A," p. 14.

Applicant was off work for seven to eight months as a

result of the 1986 New Mexico accident and underwent two surgeries.
No immediate medical care or lost work time resulted from either
the 1987 or 1988 industrially-related accidents.

See Exhibit "A,"

p. 19.
13.

In 1988, 1989, and 1990, Applicant suffered from fatigue,
3
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bloating,

sinus

dependency,

high

headaches,

ear

cholesterol,

depression and anxiety.

problems,

hot

fibromyalgia,

flashes,

drug

hypothyroidism,

See Exhibit "A," p. 19-20.

ARGUMENT
Applicant

argues that she is entitled

to permanent

total

disability award and compensation under the Workers Compensation
Act if applicant's industrial injuries contributed to Applicant's
whole person impairment rating and Applicant can show a "medically
demonstrable causal link between her industrial accident and her
permanent disability.".
In Large vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, the Supreme Court
held:
... a claimant for permanent total disability
benefits must prove medically
that
his
disability
was caused
by
an
industrial
accident. Large vs. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 758 P2d 954, 957 (1988).
Cause

means

"to

make

happen."

Websterf s

Encyclopedic

Dictionary, 1990.
In the Large matter, Mr. Large had prior back problems and
herniated lumbar disc surgery when he slipped and fell from a truck
at work.

Mr. Largefs doctor stated that Mr. Large had difficulty

in walking due to his weight and back problems.
Mr. Large had an old compression fracture.

X-rays showed that

The Utah Supreme Court

4

001 'Hi

in denying Mr. Largefs claim held:
We find substantial evidence in the record to support a
finding that the 1985 injury was not the medical cause
of Large's permanent total disability status and that
Largefs age, obesity, lack of transferable skills and
prior back surgery resulted in his disability. Large,
Infra p. 957.
In other words, the slipping from the truck at work did not
make Mr. Large disabled.
In the matter presented before the Commission, there is no
medical evidence, nor is there a medical opinion, that the August
15, 1988 incident caused Applicant's disability.

The most that can

be found are medical opinions that said accident contributed to
Applicant's overall disability.

Applicant continued to work after

the August 15, 1988 accident and even worked overtime until April
1990.

After

Applicant's

the

non-compensable

condition

was

worse

incident
and

she

of

July

suffered

9,

1990,

greater

limitations an£ could do less activity than after the August 15,
1988 incident.

X-rays taken after the 1988 accident showed no

appreciable change from those taken after the 1986 non-industrial
accident.
In addition, Applicant, in 1990, was suffering from fatigue,
bloating,
dependency,

sinus
high

headaches,

ear

cholesterol,

problems,

fibromyalgia,

hot

flashes,

polyarthritis

drug
and

hypothyroidism, depression and anxiety.
There are no medical opinions stating that any of the medical
5

problems above listed were significantly related to applicant's
industrial injury, nor was there a medical opinion as to what
actually caused applicant to become totally disabled.
In addition, Applicant has only a high school education and
has worked only as a sales clerk and in accounting and clerical
positions.

Applicant testified that she was unable to perform

these types of jobs any longer.
Applying the language of the Large case to this case, it can
be said that there is substantial evidence in the record to support
a finding that the August 15, 1988 injury was not the medical cause
of Cox's permanent total disability status and that Cox's lack of
transferable

skills, prior back

surgeries, and other medical

problems not related to her industrial injury resulted in her
disability.
Applicant

has

the

burden

of

proof

to

show

by

a

preponderance of the evidence that the medical cause of her
disability was the August 15, 1988 accident.

No such showing was

made. In fact, the ALJ found that the August 15, 1988 accident was
not the cause; but only a minor contributory factor leading to
applicant's claimed permanent total disability.

6
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CONCLUSION
Because of Applicant's numerous other medical non-industrial
related problems from which Applicant was suffering in July 1990,
and because there is no medical evidence that the August 15, 1988
industrial injury caused Applicant to become permanently totally
disabled,
Motion for
For Kevie\
Review should be denied.
uea, applicant's worion
DATED this

°1 ^ day of

jfA t*-JL

, 1993.

FAIRBOURN & PESHELL

RINEHART L. PESHELL
Attorney for Defendants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing this

9rJ^

TfY) ^-<^f

day of

, 1993, to:

EDWARD B. HAVAS
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING
ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT
2020 BENEFICIAL LIFE BUILDING
3 6 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
ERIE V. BOORMAN
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, #3 00
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111

7

00108

Appendix F:
Social Security Decision

(801)748-2127
NOTE TO PROCESSING CENTER
FURTHER ACTION NECESSARY
DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Administration
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
Refer to : 528-74-9096
Claudia A. Cox
P.O. Box 273
Orangeville, UT 84537
NOTICE OF FAVORABLE DECISION - PLEASE READ CAREFULLY
This Decision Is Favorable To You
• Another office will process the decision.
notice from that office.

You will receive a

• Your local Social Security office or another office may ask
you to give more information before you receive the notice. If
so, please answer promptly.
• If you hear nothing about this decision for 60 days, please
contact your local Social Security office.
If You Think the Decision is Wrong
• You have the right to appeal. You must file your appeal
within 60 days from the date you receive this notice. (It will
be presumed that you received the notice within 5 days after the
date shown below, unless you show us that you did not receive it
within the 5-day period.)
• When you appeal, you request the Appeals Council to review the
decision. If the Appeals Council grants your request, itTwill
review the entire record in your case. It will review those
parts of the decision which you think are wrong. It will also
review those parts which you think are correct and may make them
unfavorable or less favorable to you. You will receive a new
decision.
• You (or your representative) have to ask for the appeal in
writing. You may sign a form HA-520, called "Request for Review
by the Appeals Council," or write a letter,
• You may submit your appeal to your local Social Security
office, a hearing office, or mail it directly to the Appeals
Council, Office of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 3200,
Arlington, VA 22203.
f\r.

^*?JI

2

The Appeals Council May Review the Decision on it? Own Motion
• Within 60 days from the date shown below, the Appeals Council
may review the decision on its own motion. This could change the
decision.
• After the 60-day period, the Appeals Council may reopen and
revise the decision in certain situations.
• The Appeals Council will notify you if it decides to review
the decision on its own motion or to reopen and revise the
decision.
Unless you request review or the Appeals Council reviews the
decision on its own motion, you may not obtain a court review of
your case (sections 205(g), 1631(c)(3) or 1869(b) of the Social
Security Act).
This notice and the enclosed copy of
decision mailed
December 21, 1992
cc:
Name and Address of Representative
Chon Kandaris
Utah Legal Services
2 3 S. Carbon Ave., Suite 4
Price, UT 84501
(801)637-3049
Replaces Form HA-L502-U7
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NOTE TO PROCESSING CENTFR
FURTHER ACTION NECE^SAR^
DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Administration
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
DECISION
IN THE CASE OF

Claudia A. Cox
(Claimant)
(Wage Earner)

CLAIM FOR

Period of Disability and
Disability Insurance Benefits
528-74-9096
(Social Security Number)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case is before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a
request for hearing filed by the claimant, who is dissatisfied
with the previous determinations finding that she is not
disabled.
The claimant appeared and testified at the hearing, represented
by Chon Kandaris, a non-attorney representative. At the request
of the ALJ, G. Barrie Nielson appeared and testified as a
vocational expert.
ISSUES
The issues in this case are whether the claimant is under a
disability as defined by the Social Security Act and if so, when
her disability commenced, the duration of the disability, and
whether the insured status requirements of the Act are met for
the purpose of entitlement to a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits.
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
After a thorough evaluation of the entire record, it is concluded
that the claimant has been disabled since July 9, 1990, and met
the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on
that date and thereafter, through December 31, 1995.

OO053

Claudia A. Cox
528-74-9096
2
The claimant was 50 years old on the date her disability began.
The claimant has a 12th grade education. The claimant has not
engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the disability
onset date.
The claimant has the following impairments which are considered
to be "severe11 under the Social Security Act and Regulations: a
history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than left,
hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain;
fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory polyarthritis; polypharmacy;
hypothyroidism; degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc
disease; depression; and passive dependant personality disorder.
These impairments prevent the claimant from sustaining work
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has some
good days but the bad days out number the good days. Overall,
she has a residual functional capacity for less than a full range
of sedentary work.
The claimant's description of her limitations is
the record when considered in its entirety. The
perform her past relevant work and does not have
skills to perform other work within her residual
capacity.

consistent with
claimant cannot
transferable
functional

Given the claimant's residual functional capacity, and the
vocational factors of her age, education and past relevant work
experience, there are no jobs existing in significant numbers
that the claimant is capable of performing. The claimant is
under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and
Regulations.
FINDINGS
After consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law
Judge makes the following findings:
1.

The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Act
on July 9, 1990. The claimant has not performed any
substantial gainful activity since July 9, 1990.

2.

The claimant's impairments which are considered to be
"severe" under the.,Social Security Act are a history of
lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than
left, hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenerative
joint disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and
passive dependant personality disorder.

Claudia A. Cox
528-74-9096

3.

The claimant's impairments do not meet or equal in severity
the appropriate medical findings contained io 2 0 CFR Part
404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P (Listing of Impairments).

4.

The claimant's allegations are found to be credible.

5.

The claimant's impairments prevent her from sustaining work
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has
some good days but the bad days out number the good days.

6.

The claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work.

7.

The claimant was 50 years old on the date disability began,
which is defined as closely approaching advanced age. The
claimant has a high school education.

8.

The claimant does not have transferable skills to perform
other work within her physical and mental residual
functional capacity.

9.

Based upon the claimant's residual functional capacity, and
vocational factors, there are no jobs existing in
significant numbers which she can perform. This finding is
based upon the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14,
2 0 CFR Part 4 04, Appendix 2 to Subpart P, and the testimony
of the Vocational Expert.

10.

The claimant has been under a disability as defined by the
Social Security Act and Regulations since July 9, 1990.
DECISION

Based on the Title II application filed on April 9, 1991, the
claimant is entitled to a period of disability beginning on July
9, 1990, and to disability insurance benefits under sections
216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social Security Act,-and the
claimant's disability has continued through at least the date of
this decision.

lrie
Administrative Law Judge

December 21, 1992
Date
196

LIST OF EXHIBITS
Claudia A. Cox
CLAIMANT

528-74-9096
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

WAGE EARNER (If other than Clmt)

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

Exhibit
No.

No. of
Pages

Description
Application for Disability Insurance Benefits,
filed 4-9-91

3

Notice of Initial Denial of Disability
Insurance Benefits, dated 10-25-91

2

3

Request for Reconsideration, filed 12-17-91

2

4

Notice of Reconsideration Denial of Disability
Insurance Benefits, dated 5-15-92

3

5

Request for Hearing, filed 7-7-92

2

6

Earnings Record, dated 7-22-91

2

7

Disability Report(s), dated 1-28-91

8

8

Reconsideration Disability Report, dated 11-20-91

6

9

Vocational Report(s), dated 1-28-91

6

10

Report of Contact, re: Company Disability Plan,
dated 6-4-91

1

11

Report of Contact, dated 10-2-91

i

12

Claimant's Statement When Request for Hearing
is Filed and the Issue Is Disability,
dated 6-29-92

2

Disability Determination(s) by State Agency,
Title II, Initial dated 10-9-91;
Reconsideration dated 4-28-92 with attachments

14

Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center, dated 1-5-87 to 1-13-87

10

Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center, dated 3-9-87 to 3-15-87

9

13

14
15

nms«

LIST OF EXHIBITS
CHaudia A.
CLA'iM-Aixr

52S-74-J096

Cox

t3\j<,±i\}-i b t i L U B . u i

WAGE EARNER (If other than Clint)

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

Exhibit
NO.

16
17
18
19
20
21

ttunotitt

No. of
Pages

Description
Medical Records from Emery Medical Center, P.C.
dated 5-31-88 to 12-7-90

14

Medical Report from David Herner, M.D.,
dated 8-30-91

3

Treatment notes covering the period from
10-3-88 to 11-25-91 by Lynn Gaufin, M.D.

23

Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical
Center, dated 11-25-91 to 2-4-92

6

Medical Records from Sterling Potter, M.D.,
dated 9-6-91 to 2-26-92

5

Medical Records from Joseph R. Watkins, M.D.,
dated 12-20-91 to 3-5-92

17

Medical Report from Delvin McFarlane, LCSW,
dated 3-30-92

1

23

Resume of G. Barrie Nielson, Vocational Expert

2

24

Medical Records from Jeffrey L. Mathews, M.D.,
dated 4/7/92 to 8/12/92.

13

Medical Report from Lynn Ravesten, Ph.D., dated
11/12/92.

5

22

25
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Appendix G:
Accident Report of August 15, 1988
and Co-Employee Statements

UP&LCo. Form 6274W49 9B7

^ . . .
nialnbuiionOriginal. Iiisurtinrr Service

Y

NON-MEDICAL INJURY FORM UTAH

"~

u

-rtmnM^

Gold Safet) Orpt
Koom 133 G ()

/ ,

To: INSURANCE SERVICES

Date

n

Utah Power & Light Company
Name of Injured
\

vy--£*4<<3^^

(f .

,

< / /
/
L^lU^UciJ-.a-

)\4

/
•'/
*J...-...( LAPleaae Print

I was injured at..«»!.*. JuQ.. .QM^today
r^ZL^..../^.1^2xl<C^
Location of accident ...."^tt.J^d-iXJL<^..../...iJ?L^^
Work being performed

A~4~*r...Avenui
Avenue

Part of body injured.
Was first aid given?

^ e 8 H,

By whom

There is no indication that I will need to lose time on account of the injury but I will let you know immediately
if it becomes more serious or if there is any indication of infection or other complications.
.
Division

„

Signed by Injured

*^.<zzu~~±r&r*.
Questions, contact
Ext. 7507 G.O.

This form is to be conif

.J^^J^^

si8n^„r

:.,...,

"ed and turned in to Supervisor the day of injur^.

T ? : M n # XJ »•**«->••+ n f f n i n t « v

m n a t

Kr» o n m n l o f o r l

if frpntpH

h v fl

t\i\tr*tc%f

February 13, 1989

To Whom It May Concern:
This memo is in reference to Claudia Cox's on-the-job injury
of August 15, 1988.
As her supervisor, on August 16, 1988, I
investigated the cause of the above-stated injury as reported on
the non-medical injury form.
Claudia had stated that she had strained her shoulder, neck,
and back while opening a file cabinet at Karma 0' Bryan' s desk (a
co-worker in the same office).
I opened the same file cabinet
and found it to be very heavy and sticking as I was trying to
open it.
I, then, used some silicone spray to lubricate the
guides to allow the drawer to more easily open to eliminate any
re-occurance of strain from opening this file cabinet drawer.
I am aware of another on-the-job injury dated 12/18/87 where
a chair had slipped out from under Claudia causing her to fall
while attempting to sit down.
She informed me that this had
caused her severe pain in her lower back and that she would take
the muscle-relaxers and medication previously prescribed by her
doctor to try to keep from having a lost-time accident.
Claudia has worked for me since 1980 and had a very good
safety record up until the time of these accidents. I have found
that she observes safety regulations and is conscious of our
safety program and goals.
jS-tgned,

<

James A. Williams
Hunter P l a n n i n g Supervisor

S t a t e of Utah
County of Emery

^
Notary P u b l i c
Mv C n m r n i Q C i n n

Vvni*~^<-

HQ/n^/QQ
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w
February 13, 1989

To Whom It May Concern,
RE:

Industrial Claim - Claudia Cox
August 15, 1988

At the request of Lee Hofeling, Investigator for Energy Mutual Insurance,
I wish to affirm the fact that the file drawer in question was indeed
heavily weighted with paper for work, and would also occasionally stick
when pulling it out. On numerous occasions I would require the use of both
hands to open the drawer. This problem was only known to me since I am
usually the only one getting into this drawer. On the day that the accident
occurred, I was absent from work and Claudia was doing my work plus her own,
she needed to get into this drawer for supplies, and didn't know of the problem
that I was having with this drawer.

6L\si^><~&-

Karma 0*Bryan

State of Utah
County of Emery
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